



SAINT
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ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE DIVINE ESSENCE, AND ITS ENERGIES.

FROM THE HOLY PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE

GENNADIOS SCHOLARIOS
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A SHORT TREATISE

**ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ITS ENERGIES.**

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ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ITS ENERGIES.

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Περὶ τοῦ πῶς διακρίνονται αἱ θεῖαι ἐνέργειαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλας καὶ τὴν θεῖαν οὐσίαν, ἧς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, καὶ ἐν ἧ εἰσιν:

1. Περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐνεργειῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλας καὶ τὴν θεῖαν οὐσίαν διακρίσεως ὁ μὲν μακάριος Θεσσαλονίκης τότε Γρηγόριος, ἀκριβεστέρως ἐξητακῶς ὑφ' ἡγεμόσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῖς διδασκάλοις, πραγματικὴν ταύτην εἶναι ἐτίθει· οἱ δὲ περὶ Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἀκίνδυνον, κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνον λέγοντες αὐτὴν εἶναι, τῆς ἀληθείας ἡμάρτανον· διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὡς φιλονείκως ἀντιποιοῦμενοι τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης, δικαίως ἀπεδοκιμάσθησαν. Τῷ μακαρίῳ τοίνυν ἐκείνῳ Γρηγορίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐκκλησίας ψήφῳ συνωδὸν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐνταῦθα τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζητήματος τούτου κρίσιν ποιοῦμεθα, ὡς ἐν παρέργῳ τῆς ἡμῶν νῦν ἡσυχίας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πολυειδῶν θρήνων ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ὠρμημένοι διατριβήν, τῶν πλησιαζόντων ἡμῖν τινὸς ἀπαιτήσαντος.

Πᾶσα μὲν δὴ διάκρισις ἢ πραγματικὴ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, ὡς ἐπὶ διπλῇν τινα κορυφὴν ἀναγομένων ἄμφω τῷδε τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν ὀπιοῦν διακρινόμενων· πολυσχιδῆς δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῇ ἐστὶν ἑκάτερά· καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ ἰσχυροτέρα, ἣν πραγματικὴν ὀνομάζομεν· πολλὴν γὰρ τὴν εὐρύτητα ἔχει τὰ πράγματι διακρινόμενα, πολλῶν μὲν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς οὐσι βαθμῶν τῆς τοιαύτης διακρίσεως, ἐν ἑκάστῳ δὲ βαθμῷ

A On how divine energies are distinguished from each other and from the divine essence, of which they are energies, and in which they exist:

1. Concerning the distinction of the divine energies both from one another and from the divine essence, the blessed Gregory of Thessalonica, having examined the matter more precisely under the guidance of the teachers of the Church, maintained that this distinction is real. But those around Barlaam and Akindynos, claiming that it existed only conceptually, erred with respect to the truth; for which reason they were justly rejected by the Church, as obstinately contending for such an opinion. Therefore, in agreement with that blessed Gregory and the common judgment of our Church, we here also render our decision on this matter, as an incidental issue arising during our present stillness and the manifold sorrows associated with it, motivated to undertake such a discourse by the request of someone near to us.

Every distinction is either real or conceptual, as both kinds of distinctions ultimately lead to two fundamental summits regarding any way in which things are distinguished. However, each of these is manifold and not simple, especially the stronger one, which we call real. For great is the breadth of things distinguished in reality, since there are many degrees of such distinctions among beings, and within each degree, there are even more modes of distinction. For

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πλειόνων αὖ διακρίσεως τρόπων. Ἵνα γὰρ τὴν μεγίστην παρῶμεν διάκρισιν (ἢ μεταξὺ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσματος νοοῖτ' ἂν καὶ εἴη), οὐσία γε καὶ συμβεβηκὸς διακρίνονται μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων· ὅλω γὰρ τῷ σφῶν ὑποκειμένῳ διακέκρισθον, ὡς ἅπαν ὑπὸ τὴν οὐσίαν τυγχάνον παντὸς ὑπὸ τῷ τῶν ἐννέα γενῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκὸτος ἔργῳ διακεκρίσθαι· διακρίνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ διπήχεος, ὧν θάτερον μὲν ἐν τῷ ποσοῦ γένει, θάτερον δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ τέτακται· ἀλλ' οὐτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν, οὐθ' ἡ διάκρισις ἄνευ τῆς οὐσίας δύναιτ' ἂν εἶναι. Ὅθεν πολλῷ μᾶλλον, τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἄμφω τῷδε διακέκρισθον, καὶ ᾧ κοινωνεῖτον ἀλλήλοις, τούτῳ τῆς οὐσίας διήρησθον, τῷ μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄνευ αὐτῆς εἶναι· οὐσία δὲ ἡ κτιστὴ καὶ συνθέτη, εἰ καὶ μὴ το δύναιτο χωρὶς εἶναι συμβεβηκὸτος ἢ τινος ὅλως ἐπεισοδιῶδους, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γοῦν τῷδ' ἢ τῷδ' ὑπόκειται συμβεβηκότη· ἄλλη δὲ ἄλλοις σύνεστι, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐκ αἰετὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Ἦττον ἔτι τούτων τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἑτεροειδῆ διακρίνονται, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, λόγου χάριν, καὶ ἵππος, ὑπὸ γένει τῷ ζῳῷ, καὶ περιττόν τε καὶ ἄρτιον, ὑπὸ γε ποσῷ τῷ διωρισμένῳ· ἦττον αὖ τούτων τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἄτομα διακρίνονται· συμβεβηκὸσι γὰρ διακρίνονται μόνοις οἷς ἀτομοῦνται, εἶδει δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰσι καθάπαξ, καὶ ἀριθμῷ μόνον, οὐχὶ καὶ οὐσία, διηρημένα. Ὅδ' ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁδὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀλλήλοις συνέλθοιεν εἰς ἓν ἄτομον, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀπλῶς καὶ ἵππος, εἰς ἓν εἶδος· οὐσία δὲ ἡ συνθέτη μετὰ συμβεβηκὸτος πάσαις ἀνάγκαις συνίασιν, ὡς οὐτε τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας συμβεβηκόντων ἄνευ τινῶν δυνηθείσης ἂν εἶναί τε καὶ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸ γένος αὐτῇ ἢ τὸ εἶδος οἰκείων, οὐτε τοῦ συμβεβηκὸτος πολλῷ μᾶλλον δυνηθέντος ἂν ποτε χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας. Καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματικῶς διακρίνεσθαι λέγονται·

A example, if we consider the greatest distinction, which would be understood to exist between God and creature, essence and accident are distinguished most fundamentally among other distinctions. They differ entirely in their substrate, since everything that falls under essence is distinguished from everything that falls under one of the nine categories of accidents. For instance, whiteness is distinguished from being two cubits long, as one belongs to the genus of quantity and the other to quality. Yet neither their being nor their distinction could exist apart from essence. Hence, essence is much more fundamentally distinct than both of these, and that through which they communicate with one another is likewise distinct from essence inasmuch as it could not exist without it. Created and composite essence, even if it cannot exist without some accident or other contingent property, is not necessarily dependent on any particular accident; one essence accompanies some accidents, while the same essence is not always accompanied by the same accidents. C Even less so than these are heterogeneous things within the same genus, like man and horse in the genus of animal, or odd and even within the genus of defined quantity, which are distinguished from one another. Lesser still is the distinction among individuals of the same species, as they are distinguished only by those accidents in which they are individuated, while in species they are entirely the same and differ only in number, not essence. Thus, this particular man and this particular man could never converge into one individual, nor could man simply and horse unite into one species. D Composite essence along with accident always harmonizes with all necessities, inasmuch as this essence could neither exist nor appear apart from certain accidents, especially those most proper to

περὶ ἀπάντων γὰρ χωρὶς διεξιέναι κατὰ γένος γοῦν πολλῶν ἂν δέοιτο λόγων. Τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα συναριθμείσθων, ὧν μείζων ἐστὶν ἡ διάκρισις, ὡς καὶ λίαν καὶ ἀντικαθισταμένων ἀλλήλοις τῶν μὲν ἰσχυροτέρῃ, τῶν δ' ἥττονι ἀντιθέσει. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργῳ διακεκριμένα οὕτω πολλήν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὴν εὐρύτητα ἔχει, τῆς τοιαύτης διακρίσεως τὰ ὁπωσοῦν ὄντα διατρεχούσης ἅπαντα διαφόρως, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς ταύτῃ ἀντικειμένης ἐνότητός τε καὶ κοινωνίας· διακρίσει γὰρ παντοίαις καὶ ἐνότησιν αὖ τόδε διαμένει τὸ πᾶν, ἐξότου δὴ καὶ συνέστη. Ὅθεν οὐδ' ἡμεῖς νῦν εὐτάκτως καὶ κατὰ γένη διειλόμεθα τὰ τοιαῦτα· τουτὶ γὰρ πολλῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, δεῖται λόγων, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν βραχείῃς ὑποδείγμασι μόνον τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὕσιν ἔμπρακτον διάκρισιν ὑπεφήναμεν, ἣ διακέκριται πάντα, καὶ πρὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ καὶ λόγου διακριθῆναι, καὶ ἦν οὐκ ἐπινοοῦμεν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ζητοῦντες εὐρίσκομεν ὡς ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τούτοις ἐνοῦσαν.

2. Ἡ δὲ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν λεγομένη διάκρισις ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἐστίν, ἃ τῆς ἐπινοίας ὄντα καὶ δεύτερα νοητὰ λέγεται· αὕτη τε οὕτω καλεῖται, ὡς ἐκ τῆς εὐπορίας γινομένη τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ τυγχάνουσα. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐκ πολλῆς τῆς θεόθεν αὐτῷ δεδομένης περιουσίας ἀφαιρεῖ μὲν ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν καὶ συνθέτων ἀπλὰ τινα καὶ καθόλου νοήματα, προκόπτων εἰς ἐπιστήμην· ἐπιτίθησι δ' αὖ κατ' ἐπιστροφὴν καὶ μερικεύει ταῦτα, προκεκοφώς· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τοῦ νοῦ

it according to its genus or species, nor could the accident exist apart from essence in a much more decisive manner. All such things are thus said to be distinguished in reality, since in the case of everything, an extensive account would be required to classify each by genus. Let opposites also be included in these considerations, as their distinction is even greater, given that they are entirely opposed to each other – some more strongly, others more weakly. As has been said, things distinguished in actuality have great breadth, with such a distinction variably encompassing all things, just as unity and communion, which are opposed to it, likewise run through all things differently. Through these manifold distinctions and corresponding unities, the totality of things exists and has been constituted from the beginning. Hence, we too, for brevity's sake, have not classified such matters orderly and by genus – for this requires extensive discussion. Instead, we have merely indicated in brief examples the real distinction present among beings, by which all things are distinguished, even before they are distinguished by our mind or reasoning. This distinction is not something we impose conceptually on them, but we rather find it through inquiry as truly and really present in them.

2. The so-called conceptual distinction exists only in those things that are said to belong to thought and are secondary intentional concepts. It is thus called because it arises from the mind's resourcefulness and resides solely within the mind. For the human intellect, endowed by God with great abundance, abstracts certain simple and universal notions from particular and composite realities, thereby advancing toward knowledge. Conversely, it also imposes distinctions upon these notions by

ἔργα δεύτερα νοητὰ καὶ ἐπίνοιαι λέγονται καὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄντα, οὗτοι γὰρ κυρίως τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἡ λογικὴ στρέφεται μέθοδος· τὸ γὰρ γένος καθόλου τί ἐστι καὶ ἐπίνοια, ὡς δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ἐν δὲ τῷ πράγματι οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἢ τοιάδε. Ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως μὲν οὖν τῶν πραγμάτων γίνονται τε καὶ εἰσὶ, κὰν τῷ νῷ μόνῳ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ νοοῦνται· ἡ δὲ ποτε καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωροῦνται, τούτου εἵνεκα καὶ ἀφηρημένα ὡς ἂν δι' αὐτῶν ὁ νοῦς ἀκριβῆ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνη γνῶσιν, οὐχ ὡς καθόλου, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρη μᾶλλον οὐσιώδη τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ ῥηθείᾳ τάξιν ἔχουσιν· καὶ περιέχει μὲν οὕτω τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ γένος ὑπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐστὶ περιεχόμενον, τοῦ περιέχειν τότε καὶ περιέχεσθαι οὐ τοῖς δευτέροις νοητοῖς ἀλλὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀποδιδόμενων, ἐξ ὧν τε ἀφηρέθησαν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ δύναμει, καὶ ὡς καθόλου λοιπὸν ἐσκοποῦντο, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφηρμόζοντο. Ὅθεν καὶ ζῶον μὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καλοῦμεν οὐσιωδῶς, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῶον οὐσιωδῶς οὕτω γένος λέγομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἐντεῦθεν συνελογιζόμεθα τὸν ἄνθρωπον γένος εἶναι, ὁ καθάπαξ ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ μὲν πραγματικῶς τὸ ζῶον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Γένος δὲ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν λέγεται ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὸ παραθέσει καὶ ἃ μετέχει τοῦδε οὐσιωδῶς. Ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης παρουσίας ὁ νοῦς καὶ προτάσεις συντίθησιν ἔστιν ὅτε, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν λαμβάνων διχῇ· νοεῖ γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Πέτρος Πέτρος ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν, καὶ τὸν ὀρισμὸν δὲ τοῦ ὀριστοῦ κατηγορεῖ διαίρων, καὶ αὖ ἀντικατηγορεῖ, ὡς ἴσα τε δυναμένων καὶ ἀντιστρεφόντων ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ὡς δυσὶ κέχρηται τοῖς ἐν τι δυναμένοις, εἰ καὶ τις ἐνταῦθα πλείων διάκρισις ἢ ἐν τῷ κατηγορεῖν τι καθ' ἑαυτοῦ· ὥδε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄνομα, θάτερον δὲ λόγος, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἓν, τὸ δ' ἐκ πλείονων συντεθειμένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ

subdivision, working back into particulars; these are called secondary intentions and concepts of thought. They belong to discourse, not primarily to the thing itself, and it is around these that logical methodology revolves. For instance, genus as such is a universal and a concept, and so is species. However, these do not exist in the thing itself as such. They both come into being and exist through an abstraction from realities, and they exist and are apprehended only in the mind. Yet sometimes they are also observed in reality, for which reason they are abstracted, so that the intellect may, through them, acquire precise knowledge of realities – not as universals, but rather as more essential parts of those realities that possess a structure opposite to the one previously mentioned. Thus, species contains, while genus is contained by species. In such cases, the acts of containing and being contained are attributed not to the secondary intentions but to the realities themselves, from which they were abstracted by the power of the intellect, examined as universals, and then reapplied to the realities. Hence, we call man an animal essentially, but we do not also call animal genus essentially. For if we did so, we would then reason that man is a genus, which is altogether false. Instead, animal exists in reality according to its proper being, that is, as a living and sentient essence. Yet it is called a genus conceptually in its relation to the things subsumed under it, which partake in this essence essentially. From such intellectual abundance, the mind sometimes forms propositions, treating the same thing in two ways. For instance, it apprehends that Peter is Peter, or that man is man, and it predicates the definition of the defined, separating them, and again reciprocally predicates, as things that are equivalent and convertible. In this way, it employs two notions for one and the same thing, even

οὕτως οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐν εἰσι πρᾶγμα τὸ τε ὀριστὸν καὶ ὁ τούτου ὀρισμός· ὅθεν καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσιν.

Ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως νοητοῖς τῇ τοῦ νοῦ δυνάμει, ἃ καὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας ὄντα λέγεται καὶ δεύτερα νοητά, ἢ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἔστι διάκρισις· ἐπινοηθέντων γὰρ τοῖς πρώτοις νοητοῖς τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ καθ' αὐτά γε οὐσι, καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ νῷ ὑπαρξάντων, ἢ τε διάκρισις αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται καὶ ἡ ἔνωσις, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸν Πέτρον εἶναι Πέτρον ἐρρέθη· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ὑποκείμενος ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατηγορούμενος ὁ Πέτρος γίνεται διαιρούμενος, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ταῦτα ποιῶν, ὁ καὶ διαιρῶν εἰς ὅρους αὐτὸν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ προτάσει συνάπτων· ἐν δὲ τῷ Πέτρῳ τίθησιν οὐδὲν ἢ τοιαύτη διαίρεσις ἢ συνάφεια.

Δῆλον οὖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὥς διακρίνονται μὲν τὰ διακρινόμενα πάντα διχῶς δ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ περὶ αὐτῶν σκέψει· ἢ γὰρ ὥς ἔργῳ καὶ πράγματι διακεκριμένα θεωροῦμεν, ἢ ὥς λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ ἡμῶν. Πολυσχιδῆς δὲ ἑκάτερα τῶν διακρίσεων καὶ ποικίλη, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἢ πραγματική, ἦττον δ' ἢ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν· κἀντεῦθεν συμβαίνει τῶν πραγματικῶς διακρινομένων ἓνια, τὴν ὑποβεβηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ γένει σφῶν ἔχοντα τάξιν, τῷ μὴ λίαν ἰσχυρῶς διακρίνεσθαι, λόγῳ μόνῳ διακεκρίσθαι δοκεῖν τοῖς ἦττον ἐφιστᾶν εἰδόσι καὶ δυναμένοις.

though there is a greater distinction here than in predicating something of itself. For here, one is a name, while the other is a phrase; one is singular, while the other is composite of multiple elements. Yet even so, the defined and its definition are nonetheless one and the same thing, which is why they are interchangeable.

In those intentions derived from abstraction by the power of the intellect, which are also called beings of reason and secondary intentions, the conceptual distinction exists. For after intentions corresponding to primary concepts, which exist outside the mind as things in themselves, are conceived and thereby come to exist in the mind, both their distinction and their union occur within the mind – such as when it is said that Peter is Peter. For in reality, Peter does not become subject to or predicated of himself, nor is he divided, but it is the intellect that performs these operations, both dividing him into definitions and then uniting them again in the proposition. Such division or conjunction places nothing within Peter himself.

It is therefore clear from this that all things distinguished are divided in two ways in our consideration of them: either we view them as distinguished in actuality and reality, or merely in terms of reasoning and our conceptualization. Each type of distinction is manifold and varied, though the real distinction is more so, and the conceptual distinction less so. Hence, it happens that some things distinguished in reality, which occupy a subordinate position in their respective genus and are not sharply differentiated, may appear to those less knowledgeable or capable as if they were distinguished solely by reasoning.

3. Τούτων καθόλου προϋποτεθειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἰόντες λοιπόν, ἅμα καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα μᾶλλον σαφηνιούμεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ θεῶν ὀνομάτων ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ ζήτησις νῦν, πότερον πρᾶγμα τι σημαίνουσιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πραγματικὴν διαφορὰν τὰ διάφορα, ἢ ἐπίνοιά τις μόνον εἰσὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ ἢ τούτων σημασία τε καὶ διάκρισις, μικρόν τι προειληφότες περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορᾶς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἤξομεν.

Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα διαφόρως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀποδίδονται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ τῷ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος λόγῳ. Φαμέν γὰρ τὸν Πέτρον οὐσιωδῶς ἀνθρώπον εἶναι· τῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπος ὀνόματι σύνεστι πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας εὐθὺς μέχρις αὐτοῦ κατιοῦσιν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται οἰκείως καὶ τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν σειρᾷ ἀρμοζόντως. Λέγομεν δὲ καὶ σοφὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀγαθόν, εἴτα καὶ λευκὸν ἢ ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ εὐμεγέθη. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑγιαίνειν ἢ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κυρίως συμβεβηκότα λέγεται, ὡς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄντα καὶ πλείοσι κοινὰ τυγχάνοντα, οὐκ ἀνθρώποις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζώοις ἄλλοις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἀψύχοις ἔνια τούτων· σοφία δὲ καὶ ἀγαθότης καὶ δικαιοσύνη κατὰ ψυχὴν αὐτῷ προσήκοντα τῷ τῆς ἕξεως κατηγοροῦνται λόγῳ, ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀρχὴ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς προκεκοφόσιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προκόπτειν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἕξεως ἢ ἐνέργεια· καὶ σοφία μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ, ἀγαθότης δέ, ἠθικὴ ἰδίως λαμβανομένη· καθολικώτερον δὲ θεωρουμένη τὴν σύμπασαν ἀρετὴν δηλοῖ. Δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἰδιαίτερον κοινωνικὴ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, ἢ ἐν ἐλάττωσιν, ὡς οἰκονομικὴ, ἢ ἐν πλείοσιν, ὡς πολιτικὴ· ὑπὲρ δὲ ταύτας, ἢ δικαστικὴ καὶ ἄρχοντι πρέπουσα. Καὶ

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3. Having laid down these general premises, let us now proceed to the matter at hand, clarifying at the same time the points already mentioned. Since our inquiry concerns divine names – whether they signify something in God and the distinctions between them reflect a real difference, or whether their meaning and distinction are merely conceptual constructions of our mind – let us first briefly consider the differentiation of names in beings, especially in humans. From this, we will address the question under investigation.

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Names, therefore, are assigned to things in various ways: some are predicated essentially of them, while others are predicated in relation to a concomitant accident. For we say that Peter is essentially a man, but „man“ as a name pertains to everything that belongs to the essence and comes from it, as it is observed properly and fittingly with respect to him in a sequence. We also say that someone is wise, just, or good, and further, that someone is white, healthy, or large. „Health“ or „whiteness“ and similar qualities are chiefly spoken of as accidents, as they pertain to the body and are common to many, not only to humans but also to other animals, and even to plants and inanimate things to some extent. Wisdom, however, and goodness and justice are predicated according to the soul, belonging to the one possessing the relevant quality, whether it be an active quality, as with those who excel and are well-established, where the activity serves as the foundation. Wisdom, then, is the virtue of the speculative intellect, while goodness, understood in the more universal sense, signifies all virtues collectively. Justice, on the other hand, is primarily a social virtue, either in its lesser form, such as economical justice, or in its broader,

προφέρονται μὲν θηλυκῶς τὰ τὴν ἕξιν
σημαίνοντα πάντα· τὰ δὲ τὴν ἕξιν
ἔχοντα παρωνυμούνται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν
τριγενῶς· σοφὸς γὰρ λέγεται τῷ σοφίαν
ἔχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ λευκός, τῷ ἔχειν
λευκότητα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὡσαύτως. Κοινῶς μὲν οὖν ποιότητες
ταῦτα καλοῦνται, ἀφ’ ὧν ἕκαστον
οἰκειῶς παρωνυμάζεται· ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν
εἰσιν οὐσιώδεις ποιότητες, ὡς αἱ
διαφοραί, οἷον λογικότης καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα· ἄλλαι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
Μείζους μὲν αἱ τῇ ψυχῇ πρόεπουσαι· οὐ
γὰρ καθάπαξ εἰσιν ἐπεισοδιώδεις, ἀλλὰ
τρόπῳ τινὶ καὶ σύμφυτοι· ἥττους δὲ αἱ
σωματικαί. Τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν σωματικαί
καὶ τοῖς ὑφειμένοις ἐπιλέγονται
κτίσμασιν, οὔτε πᾶσαι οὔτε αἱ αὐταὶ
ἅπασιν, ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλοις· αἱ δὲ ψυχικαί
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιλέγονται μόνοις, εἰ
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνιαι αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε
καταχρηστικῶς καὶ οὐ κυρίως
ἀποδίδονται· κατηγορεῖται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ζώων τε καὶ φυτῶν καὶ τῶν
ὄντων ἀπλῶς, ἃ Θεοῦ εἰσιν ἔργα, τῇ
όλοσχερεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐννοίᾳ, ἢ πρὸς τὸ
ἀπλῶς ἂν ἀντιστρέφει· καὶ τὸ σοφὸν αὖ
μελίττης κατηγορεῖται καὶ μύρμηκος,
καὶ ὄφεος ἢ φρόνησις. Ἀλλὰ νῦν περὶ
ἀνθρώπων μόνον σκοπεῖν χρή καὶ τῶν
ἐπιλεγόμενων αὐτοῖς ὀνομάτων τῷ
τρόπῳ τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ ἕξεων.

Τὴν τοίνυν σοφίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατηγοροῦντες ἐπειδὴν σοφὸς ἦ,
πρῶτῳ τι ἐπιτίθεμεν αὐτῷ ὡς ἕξιν
ἐπαληθεύουσιν, ἥτις ἀρχὴ ἐστὶν
ἐνεργείας τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἕξει προεπούσης·
ὡσαύτως καὶ δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ
κατηγοροῦντες ποιοῦμεν· καὶ ἔστιν
ἄλλο μὲν δικαιοσύνης ἔργον, τῆς δὲ
σοφίας ἕτερον· διὸ καὶ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ
σοφὸν εἰπεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ δίκαιον
φάναι· ὅθεν καὶ διαφόρως ταῦτα ἐν

C political form. Furthermore, judicial and
governing justice preside over these
categories. We apply feminine terms to
everything that denotes a quality, and for
those possessing a certain quality, we use
related terms based on these. For
example, „wise“ is predicated of one
possessing wisdom, just as „white“ is
predicated of one having whiteness, and
similarly with other qualities. In general,
qualities are spoken of in terms of their
nature, from which each thing is
appropriately named. However, there are
essential qualities, like differences such
D as logic and its related concepts, while
others are merely accidental. The greater
virtues pertain to the soul, as they are not
episodic but rather in some way inherent
and inseparable. In contrast, bodily
virtues are weaker. Among these, the
bodily qualities are related to living
things, but not in the same way for all –
some apply only to humans, while some
apply to others in a manner not central
but accidental. The good is, in this way,
spoken of as pertaining to animals,
plants, and all beings in the
comprehensive sense, since these are the
works of God in the total sense of
goodness, either relating simply to it or
A acting in opposition. Likewise, wisdom is
predicated of a bee or an ant, or a
serpent’s prudence. But now we must
focus on humans alone and the names
attributed to them in accordance with the
mode of their psychic powers or habits.

When we speak of the wisdom of a man,
asserting that he is wise, we attribute to
him a certain quality as an inherent habit,
which is the source of activity fitting such
B a habit. Similarly, when we speak of his
justice, we make the same attribution.
The work of justice is different from that
of wisdom; thus, it is one thing to say a
person is wise and another to say they are
just. Therefore, these qualities are found
differently in humans; one man may be

ἀνθρώποις εὐρίσκεται· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστι σοφὸς μᾶλλον ἢ δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· τῷ δὲ καὶ ἄμφω καλῶς πρόσσεστιν, ὡς οἶόν τε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. Ὡςπερ οὖν ἄλλο δικαιοσύνης ἔργον, οὐ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν ᾧ εἰσι πραγματικῶς διακρίνονται, καὶ ἰσχυροτέρῳ γε διακρίσεως τρόπῳ. Ὅθεν καὶ καὶ σοφίας αὐτῷ ἕτερον, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τούτων ἀρχαὶ αὐταί, τῷ τῆς ἕξεως θεωρούμεναι τρόπῳ, διεννηνόχασιν ἀλλήλων· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δικαιοσύνη, ἕτερον δὲ σοφία, καὶ πραγματικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ διαφέρουσιν, πεφύκασιν μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἕξεις καὶ ἀρετὰς τῷ γε λόγῳ τοῦ σφῶν εἶδους, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ πάντες κτησάμενοι αὐτὰς ἔχουσιν, οὔτε γεγονότες εὐθὺς ἔχουσι, χρόνῳ δὲ καὶ σπουδῇ προσλαμβάνουσιν, ἔμφυτον ἔχοντες τὴν πρὸς ταύτας παρασκευὴν μόνην, ὥςπερ σπινθήρα χρόνῳ καὶ σπουδῇ δυναμένην ἐξάπτεσθαι· οἱ δὲ μὴ σπουδάσαντες, οὐδὲ κτῶνται, ἀλλ' ὥςπερ πάντα ἀποπεφυκότες ἔχουσιν. Εἰσὶν οὖν τελειότητες ἀνθρώπου κατὰ ψυχὴν αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι ὡς ἰδίως ἀνθρωπεῖα ψυχῇ προσήκουσαι· οὔτε δὲ παντάπασιν ἐπεισοδιῶδεις εἰσὶν, οὔτε καθάπαξ συμπεφυκυῖαι, δύναμιν πρὸς αὐτὰς ἐχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἔμφυτον. Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπου τοσαῦτα πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρεῖαν ἀρκεῖται.

4. Τοῦ δὲ Θεοῦ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖσθαι δύναται, πάντα ὄντος ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀπλουστάτου, ἔτι τε φύσει τελειοτάτου καὶ ἀϊδίου· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τῶν τελειότητων τῆς ἀνθρωπεύσεως ψυχῆς, ἀσωμάτου τε οὐσης καὶ χωριστῆς, εὐλογόν ἐστιν ἐπιλέγεσθαι αὐτῷ· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς πλεονεκτήματα, δι' ἣν αὐτὸν εἰκόνα Θεοῦ τὰ θεῖα καλεῖ λόγια, σ πολλῶ μᾶλλον τῷ παραδείγματι δέον ἂν εἶναι παρῆναι, καὶ τῷ αἰτίῳ τὰ τοῖς

wiser than he is just, and another the opposite. A person may possess both qualities equally well, as is appropriate for a human. Just as there is a work of justice, not only toward one another but also toward humans themselves, where real differences are made, there is even a stronger mode of distinction. Therefore, there is another aspect of wisdom as well, just as there are origins of these virtues, differing from one another as we consider them in terms of the manner of habits. Furthermore, there is a real distinction between wisdom and justice in humans, as these virtues differ substantially. While all humans are naturally inclined toward such virtues and qualities according to their nature, not all possess them, nor do they immediately manifest. Through time and effort, these virtues are acquired, as the natural potential toward them exists as an inner preparedness, similar to how a spark can, with time and effort, catch fire. Those who do not exert effort will not acquire them, but will, as it were, remain deficient. These virtues, in the sense of human perfection, pertain to the soul and are expressed through activities corresponding to the nature of the human soul. They are not episodic, nor are they innately fused, but have an inherent potential within the soul that, with effort, becomes realized. And concerning humans, these considerations suffice for our present needs.

4. Of God, nothing accidental can be predicated, since He is entirely incorporeal and most simple, moreover by nature most perfect and eternal; yet it is reasonable to attribute to Him the names of perfections of the human soul, which is incorporeal and separable. For the advantages of the human soul, on account of which divine scriptures call him the image of God, should much more be present in the prototype, and in the cause those things which exist for the

αἰτιατοῖς εἰς εὐφημίαν ὄντα καὶ κόσμον· καὶ ἔγνωσται μὲν ἡμῖν ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ κτισμάτων τῇ ἐξ αὐτοῦ χορηγία, ὡς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σπουδῇ τε αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ χάριτι τῆς ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασι πολυειδοῦς ἀληθείας ἐξεταστικούς· ποιῆσαι ἠθέλησε καὶ εὐρετικούς· οὐκ ἀποδίδεται μέντοι παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῷ ταῦτα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖς κτίσμασι τρόπον, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πρεπούσης ὑπεροχῆς τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ, οὐ σταθμιζόντων ἡμῶν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασιν ὕφεσιν, οὔτε δυναμένων σταθμίζειν· τουτὶ δὲ μόνον ἐκάστῳ τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων προσλογιζομένων, ὅτι γε ἀσυγκρίτῳ ὑπεροχῇ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔργα ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἀποδίδεται κοινωνία, ὡς ἐκείνῳ μὲν κυρίως καὶ πρώτως καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ προσσηκόντων, τοῖς δὲ κτίσμασιν αὖ κατὰ μετοχὴν καὶ ἵχνους ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁμοίότητά· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦ σημαίνειν τρόπον ἡμῖν τε ἀποδίδομεν αὐτὰ καὶ Θεῷ, μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς μέντοι γε σημασίας αὐτῶν ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀληθεστέρας ἐκεῖ, ὅσῳ καὶ ἀσυγκρίτως ἐμπράκτου τε καὶ εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ τελείας. Καὶ τί δεῖ περὶ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀγαθότητος καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκοπεῖν; Ὁ Θεὸς μονὰς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὑπερφυῆς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀληθεστάτη καὶ ἔμπρακτος, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὑπερφυῆς, τοσοῦτῳ πλέον ἀληθεστάτη· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἷς ἐστίν, ὑπὲρ ἅπαν ἐν ὑπάρχον τε καὶ λεγόμενον, ἢ μᾶλλον μόνος εἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς καὶ κυρίως, ὡς ἀπλούστατός τε ἅμα τῇ φύσει καὶ ἁπειρος. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τριάς ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς καὶ τριάδος ἀπάσης ἐν τοῖς οὕσι θεωρουμένης ἀρχὴν τρόπον ὑπερφυᾶ καὶ ἐξαίρετον. Οὐκοῦν, εἰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην ἡμῶν περὶ Θεοῦ ταῦτ' ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἂν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ ἦσαν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν ὁ Θεὸς τριάς καὶ μονὰς ἐπινοία μόνον, ἃ τῆς Ἀρείου καὶ Σαβελλίου μανίας κυήματα· ὥσπερ δὲ ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τὴν τε ἔνωσιν καὶ διάκρισιν τίθεμεν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τοῖς τῆς

effects in praise and adornment. And these have been known to us from the beginning through the works of God and His creatures by His provision, who desired to make humans investigative and inventive of the manifold truth in the creatures by their zeal and His grace. However, these are not attributed to Him by us in the same manner as to creatures, but with the befitting superiority of the cause of all things, we not measuring it against the diminution in creatures, nor being able to measure it. We only add to each of such names this: that the communication of these names is attributed with an incomparable superiority to the works of God, so that they belong to Him properly, primarily, and essentially, but to creatures by participation and, so to speak, a trace of analogy. But even though we do not attribute them to Him and to ourselves in the same manner of signification, we do so with the true signification, and by that measure, with greater truth there, insofar as they are immeasurably real, sincere, and perfect. And what is there to consider about wisdom, goodness, and power, and things like them? God is a monad, and He is supra-natural, but most truthful and real, and the more He is supernatural, the more truthful He is. Therefore, He is one above all things that exist and are spoken of, or rather He is truly and primarily one, as absolutely simple by nature and infinite. But He is truly a Triad and the principle of every triad observed in beings in a supernatural and exceptional manner. Therefore, if these things were spoken about God by our conception alone, they would not be in act and truth within Him, but God would be Triad and Monad only by conception, which are the offspring of the madness of Arius and Sabellius. Just as we establish unity and distinction in God in act and truth, by the names of monad and triad we attribute the Triad and

μονάδος καὶ τριάδος ὀνόμασι τὴν συνεγνωσμένην ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ τριάδα τε καὶ μονάδα, τῷ μὲν τρόπῳ τῆς αὐτῶν σημασίας τε καὶ ὑπάρξεως παριέντες, τὴν δὲ γε σημασίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἀποδιδόντες αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ νοεῖν ἅμα, ὅτι θεοπρεπῶς καὶ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς κτίστη προσήκει ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἀλήθεια, ἔνεστί τε αὐτῷ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀποδοτέα ἐστὶν ἐν τε τῷ φρονήματι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ· οὕτω καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων τελειότητων ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν ἀνυμνοῦμεν, ὡς ἀπάσης τελειότητος πλήρη τε ὄντα καθ' αὐτὸν αἰδίδως, ἣ προσήκει Θεῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πηγὴν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθεῖσι γεγεννημένον καὶ ὄντα, ὡς οἷόν τε ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ μετασχεθῆναι καλά. Διὸ μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπεροχικῆς διακρίσεως τὴν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀνόμασιν οἰκείαν ἀλήθειαν, ἄλλην ἐν ἄλλῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀποδίδομεν αὐτῷ τῷ Θεῷ· σοφὸν γὰρ καλοῦμεν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δυνατόν καὶ τ' ἄλλα ὑμνοῦντες, οὐκ ἐπεισοδιῶδη ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' αὐτοσοφίαν ὄντα καὶ αὐτοαγαθότητα καὶ αὐτοδύναμιν. Καὶ προσθήκαις δὲ τισιν ἔσθ' ὅτε φανεροῦμεν, ὡς οἷόν τε ἐστὶ, τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτισμάτων ἕκαστον δύναμιν ἔχον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν οἰκείως τῇ φύσει, δυνατόν πρὸς τοῦτο λέγεται· ἀπλῶς δὲ δυνατόν οὐτ' ἐστὶν οὔτε λέγεται· οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς πᾶν ὅτιοῦν δυνατόν ἐστὶν, οὔτε πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε τὴν δύναμιν πανταχόθεν ἅμαχον ἔχει καὶ δραστηκὴν· Θεὸν δὲ μόνον κυρίως· καὶ ἀληθῶς εἰδότες δυνατόν ὄντα, βουλόμενοί τε τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ προσδιορισμῷ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν δηλοῦν, παντοδύναμον καλοῦμεν καὶ ἀπειροδύναμον, οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μόνον ὁμοίως καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πανάγαθόν τε καὶ ὑπεράγαθον. Ὡς οὖν ἀληθῶς ὄντος δυνατοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις

B

C

D

A

Monad known to us in His works, setting aside the mode of their signification and existence, but rendering their signification and existence to Him together with the understanding that, as befits a Creator supernaturally and divinely, the truth of these names is inherent in Him and must be attributed by us both in thought and in reason. Thus we also hymn Him with the names of other perfections, as being full of every perfection in Himself eternally, as is proper to God, and having become a source for others who have been created by Him, so far as it is possible for them to partake of the Creator's good things. Therefore, with such a supereminent distinction, we attribute to God Himself the proper truth in such names, a different truth in different names: for we call Him wise and good and powerful, praising these things, not as having them accidentally, but as being Wisdom itself, Goodness itself, and Power itself. And sometimes we reveal, as far as possible, such superiority through certain additions: for each of the creatures, having a power to be and to do something proper to its nature, is said to be powerful in this regard; but simply powerful it is neither is nor is said to be. For it is not powerful towards everything, nor does it possess a power that is entirely uncontested and active from all sides – this belongs to God alone. Truly knowing Him to be powerful, and wishing to indicate the reality of the name and its truth with a more precise definition, we call Him all-powerful and infinite in power. Nor do we call Him good only, but all-good and beyond good. As He is truly powerful and good, and the truth understood by us in these names is really attributed to Him, therefore we also comprehend with the mind and acknowledge with the tongue the surpassing and distinguished nature of His goodness and power through such

νοουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀληθείας ἐμπράκτως ἀποδιδομένης αὐτῷ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις προσθήκαις τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ ἐξηρημένον τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως τῷ τε νῷ συλλαμβάνομεν καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐδ' ἐλαττοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσθήκαις τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ πραγμα τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαιομένης ἀληθείας, μεγεθύνειν δὲ μᾶλλον ὥς οἶόν τε πειρώμεθα. Καὶ τί δεῖ B περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων σκοπεῖν, ἃ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς τελειότητος ἢ ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν αὐτῷ; Τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδίδοσθαι ὀνόματα δεῖ, καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πάσης οὐσίας ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ὑπερκειμένην, οὐκ ἄλλο τι καλοῦμεν χωρίζον αὐτὴν τῆς κατὰ τοῦνομα τοῦτο γνωριζομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' ὑπερούσιον μόνον καλοῦμεν, τῇ προσθήκῃ ταύτῃ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐμφαίνοντες μόνον τῆς κατὰ C τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας, τὸ διὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἡμῖν παριστάμενον.

Ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄρκοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἀκριβῆ τε ἅμα καὶ δυνατὴν θεολογίαν ἡμῖν τοῖς καταφατικοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις τὸν Θεὸν ἀνυμνεῖν, ὀλίγων ὄντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων, ἃ τῆς τῶν ὄντων τελειότητος ἀπολαμβάνόμενα, τῇ τούτων αἰτία μεταβιβάζεται καλῶς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὥς ἐκείνη μάλιστα πρέποντα πολλαχόθεν μεθ' ὑπερφυοῦς τῆς ὑπεροχῆς, καὶ τοῖς ἀφαιρετικοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποφατικοῖς D αὐτὸν ὑμνοῦμεν ὀνόμασι, τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς θεολογίας ὥς οἶόν τε ἐστίν, ἐνταῦθα πλάτος ὑφαίνοντες· αἰδῖον γὰρ καλοῦμεν, τῶν χρόνων ἡργμένων χωρίζοντες, καὶ ἄπειρον, τῶν πεπερασμένων, καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ὁμοίως, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Καὶ εἰκότα μὲν στερήσῃ ταυτὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀποφάσεις δὲ μᾶλλον εἰσι τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων περὶ Θεοῦ νοεῖσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι· ἄπειρον γὰρ ὥς μὴ ἔχοντα πέρας καλοῦμεν, καὶ ἀκατάληπτον, ὥς οὐκ

additions, nor do we diminish by these additions what is and the reality of the truth signified by the names, but we rather attempt to magnify it as much as possible. And why should one investigate the other names which we attribute to Him by reason of perfection or activity? The very essence of God, which must have such names attributed to it, and which necessarily transcends all essence infinitely and in an infinite manner, we do not call by anything else separating it from the truth known to us in beings by this name, but we call it only „hyper-essential“, indicating by this addition only the superiority of the truth according to the thing represented by this name.

As it is not sufficient for an accurate and possible theology to hymn God by affirmative names alone, these being few in number, which, taken from the perfection of beings, are well transferred by us to their cause as most befitting it from many aspects with supernatural superiority, we also praise Him with negative, or rather privative names, weaving here as much as possible the breadth of true theology. For we call Him eternal, separating Him from those begun in time, and infinite, from the finite, and incomprehensible likewise, and such things. And these names seem like negations, but they are rather denials of what should not be understood or said about God. We call Him infinite as not having limits, and incomprehensible, as there is no comprehension of Him by a created mind. These are also reasonably transferred to the names of perfections.

οὔσης αὐτοῦ καταλήψεως τῷ κτιστῷ νῶ· μεταφέρονται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εὐλόγως πρὸς τὰ τῶν τελειότητων ὀνόματα· εἰ γὰρ ἀσύνθετός ἐστι δὲ πάντη, οὐκοῦν πάντη ἀπλοῦς ἐστι· καὶ εἰ ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἄυλος, νοῦς ἄρα εἰλικρινής ἐστι· καὶ εἰ ἄπειρος ἐνεργεία τε καὶ ἰσχύϊ, οὐκοῦν τέλειος ἐσχάτως ἐστίν, ὥς τὸ πεπεράνθαι τοῖς ἀτελέσι προσῆκον· ὥστε δοκοῦσι μὲν ἀποφάσκειν εὐθὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα, καὶ τί οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς μόνον δηλοῦν· ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν οὐχ ἀρμοσπόντων αὐτῷ ἀποφάσει αἱ τῶν ἀρμοσπόντων μᾶλλον καταφάσεις εἰσάγονται· συνέμιξε γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ καὶ τελειότητάς γε, ἄλλοις ἄλλας εὐτάκτως, καὶ πᾶσιν αὖθις ὁμοῦ τὴν τοῖς κτιστοῖς ἀρμόττουσαν κατὰ γε τὰ ἄλλα ἔλλειψιν καὶ ἀτέλειαν, ὥς ἄνευ τῆς δυοῖν τούτων συνόδου ἀδύνατον ὑποστήναί τε ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι τελειότητων κοινωνεῖ μὲν οὐχ ὥς ἐκεῖθεν μεταλαμβάνων, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινούμενος· ὑπέρεκειται δὲ κατ' αὐτὰς τῷ μείζονος ἔχειν ἀσυγκρίτως τε καὶ ὑπερφυῶς· τῶν δὲ γε ἐνδειῶν καθάπαξ κεχώριται. Διὸ καὶ ἀποφάσκομεν ταύτας αὐτοῦ, τῇ δὲ αὐτῶν ἀποφάσει τὰς ἀντικειμένας μᾶλλον ἀποδίδομεν αὐτῷ τελειότητας. Οὐκοῦν τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν καταφατικῶς ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀποφατικοῖς τούτοις ἀρμόττει πως, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως· ἀναιροῦσι γὰρ εὐθὺς τὸ ἀλλότριον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐντεῦθεν ἀκολουθουσῶν οἰκειῶς τῶν καταφάσεων, αἷς χρή τὰ εἰρημένα ἀρμόττειν.

5. Τούτων προϋποτεθειμένων μετρίως, ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον λοιπὸν ἐρχόμεθα. Αἱ θεῖαι τοίνυν τελειότητες εἴτουνν ἐνεργεῖαι, αἱ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων δηλούμεναι, διακρίνονται μὲν ἀλλήλων καὶ τῆς ἐν ἧ εἰσι θείας οὐσίας· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μέλλοιμεν εἰκῇ ταῦτα περὶ Θεοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν τι δεῖ νοεῖν τῷ

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For if He is absolutely uncomposed, then He is absolutely simple; and if He is incorporeal and immaterial, then He is a pure intellect; and if He is infinite in activity and power, then He is ultimately perfect, as being limited befits the imperfect. So these names seem to deny immediately and only show what God is not. But by the denial of what is not fitting to Him, the affirmations of what is fitting are introduced. For God has mixed perfections with His works, orderly distributing different ones to different beings, and again to all together the deficiency and imperfection appropriate to created things, as without the conjunction of these two it would be impossible for these to subsist and exist. He participates in the perfections in the works not as if receiving from them, but as communicating from Himself to others. He transcends them by having immeasurably and supernaturally greater ones. He is entirely separated from deficiencies. Therefore, we deny these of Him, and by their denial we attribute to Him the opposite perfections. Thus, what was previously said about affirmatively spoken names of God also somewhat applies to these negative names, even if not immediately. For they immediately remove the alien, but in such a way that appropriate affirmations follow from them, to which the said things must apply.

D

5. These things being moderately assumed, we now proceed to the sought-after. The divine perfections, that is, the energies, which are made known by these names, are distinguished both from each other and from the divine essence in which they are. For if we did not intend to speak and think carelessly about these

τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματι, ἄλλο δὲ τι τῷ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τοῖς διαφόροις αὐτῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὀνόμασι καὶ διαφόρους ἐνεργείας ἐπινοεῖν· διακρίνονται δὲ οὔτε πάντῃ πραγματικῶς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὕτω διακρινομένων διάκρισιν, οὔτε κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην· εἰ μὲν γὰρ πραγματικῶς οὕτω διακρίνονται, A σύνθετον ἔσται τὸ θεῖον, ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστῶς καὶ διακεκριμένων πραγμάτων, ἄλλως τε τὸ διακεκρίσθαι ταῦτα οὕτω πραγματικῶς ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασι τῇ προσηκούσῃ τούτοις ἐνδεία πρέπον ἔστιν, ὑπερπλήρης δὲ ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ὑπερτελής, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπερτελῶς αὐτῷ σύνεστιν ὥς ἐνί τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀπλουστάτῳ, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν αὐτῷ εἰσι ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα ἔστιν αὐτός. Εἰ δὲ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ διακρίνονται κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ τῆς διακρίσεως ταύτης διορισμόν, εἰκαία μὲν καὶ περιττὴ ἢ περὶ B ταῦτα τῆς ἱερᾶς θεολογίας ἂν εἴη σπουδὴ, ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀνόμασι τὸν Θεὸν ἐξαίρει πανταχοῦ προὔργου καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκάστῳ ἰδίαν ἀφορίζει τὴν σημασίαν τοῖς θείοις ἔργοις οὕτω φανερουμένην τε καὶ συνάδουσάν, καὶ τὸν Θεὸν εἰσάγει μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπονέμοντα πολλαχοῦ. Παύσαιτο δ' ἂν ποτε δίκαιος ἂν καὶ σοφὸς καὶ ἄλλα τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων τε καὶ δοξαζομένων, τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου νοῦ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν πεπαυμένου ἂν καθάπαξ ἢ τοῦ εἶναι ὅλως, ἢ τοῦ τοιαῦτα ἐπινοεῖν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ Πέτρος ἔσται ποτὲ ὑποκείμενος ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατηγορούμενος ἅμα, οὐδὲ γένος ἔσται καὶ εἶδος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνον ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γίνεται, τοῦ δυναμένου ταυτὶ ποιεῖν νοῦ οὐκ ὄντος, ἢ μὴ βουλομένου, καὶ ἢ τε καὶ δύνηται. Ἄπαν μὲν γὰρ ἂν νοεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, καὶ μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ νοητὸν ἢ· ἔστι δ' οὐδὲν ἥττον καθ' αὐτό, καὶ μὴ νοούμενον· τὰ δὲ τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐ δύνανται εἶναι χωρὶς τοῦ νοοῦντος αὐτὰ D νοῦ. Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοια καὶ

things concerning God, one thing must be conceived under the name of essence, and another thing under the name of energy, and to the different names of the energies must correspond different energies. But they are distinguished not absolutely in reality according to the distinction of other things that are thus distinguished among beings, nor in thought alone. For if they were distinguished really, the divine would be composite, consisting of many conjoined and distinct things. Moreover, the real distinction is fitting in creatures due to their inherent deficiency. But God is superabundant and perfect, and these things, as perfectly and naturally one and absolutely simple, and these are not more in Him than He is Himself these things. But if they were distinguished solely by thought and mental abstraction, according to the precise determination of such a distinction, then the pursuit of sacred theology concerning these matters would be aimless and redundant. Sacred theology, after all, exalts God everywhere through such names, assigns to each of these names a specific meaning particular to the divine works, thus made manifest and harmonized through them, and reveals God in a manner that accords more with Himself by attributing such names to Him on various occasions. Yet, God would never cease being just, wise, or any of the other things said and believed about Him, even if the human intellect, on its part, should entirely cease, either in its existence or in its capacity to conceive such things. For just as Peter can never at once both subsist in himself and be predicated of himself, neither can genus, species, or similar things – existing and coming to be only in the mind by abstraction – exist when no intellect capable of producing these exists or does not wish to, even if it is able and willing. For everything is capable of being conceived, even if it is not intelligible by

δεύτερα νοητὰ καλοῦνται, ὡς τῇ νοήσει ἐπιτιθέμενα· καὶ ὡς αὕτη πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῇ νοητὸν φέρεται, οὕτως ἡ ἐπίνοια πρὸς τὴν περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ φέρεται νόησιν, καὶ οὐ τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα σκοπεῖ προὔργου, ἀλλ' ὅποιον τί ἐστι μᾶλλον τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ νοούμενον νόημα. Ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀπλῇ ἐστὶν αὕτη, τετραχῇ δὲ μερίζεται τοῖς ἀκριβοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· πρώτη τε γάρ ἐστιν ἐπίνοια καὶ δευτέρα, καὶ τούτων αὖ ἑκατέρω, ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ συγκεκριμένῳ, ἡ δὲ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. Διὸ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπινοίας σπουδὴ οὐ γινώσις αὐτίκα τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν, ἡ νοητὰ εἰσι, καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' ὄργανον τῆς τοιαύτης γνώσεως μᾶλλον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἂν δέοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλήθειαν ἀνιχνεύειν εὐτάκτως καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδεικνύναι τέχνη τις μεθωδευομένη σοφῶς. Δέοι γ' ἂν οὖν σιγῇ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς τιμᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἢ τοιούτοις ἐξαίρειν ὀνόμασιν, ὑφ' ἡμῶν μὲν ἐπινοούμενοις, ἡκιστα δὲ αὐτοῦ πραγματικῶς ἀπτομένοις, οὐδ' ἔχουσι καὶ δυναμένοις τι τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν ἀληθείας ἔργῳ δεικνύναι, ἐπινοία δὲ μόνον ἡμῶν συντιθεμένοις τε καὶ διακρινόμενοις ἀλλήλων· καὶ ἄλλως δὲ χώραν οὐκ ἔχει τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπινοίας ἐπὶ Θεοῦ. Ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τοῖς συστοίχοις τε καὶ ἑτερογενέσι, πᾶσι δὲ πρὸς ἓν τι γένος ἀναγομένοις κοινὸν ἀρμόττει, καὶ ταῖς τούτων ἐφαρμογαῖς τε καὶ διαιρέσεσιν. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς οὐθ' ὑπὸ τι γένος, οὔτε γένος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. Εἰ δὴ τοῦνομα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἡ φιλανθρωπίας ἐν τῷ Θεῷ πρᾶγμα τι δηλοῦσιν, ὃ κἀνταῦθα σημαίνειν τετάχεται ἐν τοῖς μετεσχηκόσιν οἰκείως τῇ σφῶν φύσει, διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν τέθεινται οὕτως (πλὴν ἐκεῖ μετὰ πλείστης, ὡς εἴρηται, τῆς ὑπεροχῆς, ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τῶν ἀρμοζόντων αὐτοῖς ἔργων εἶναι σημαντικά, ὡς οὕτω τῷ Θεῷ προσσηκόντων), πῶς οὐ διοίσουσιν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τῇ κατ' αὐτά, καὶ πῶς οὐκ

A

itself; nevertheless, it exists in itself, even if it is not conceived. But the constructs of mental abstraction cannot exist without the intellect conceiving them. For this reason, they are also called abstractions and secondary intentions, as they are superimposed on intellectual activity. Just as this activity is directed toward its corresponding intelligible object, so abstraction is directed toward the conception concerning the intelligible object. It does not primarily aim to grasp the actual reality of the thing but rather the kind of conception held about it. Hence, this abstraction is not simple but is divided into four forms for those precise in such matters: for there is both a first and a second abstraction, and each of these in turn either pertains to the concrete or arises from removal. Thus, the study of such abstractions is not immediately knowledge of beings as they are intelligible, nor of the truth inherent in them, but rather a tool for such knowledge. It is a methodical discipline that aims to wisely discover and demonstrate the truth present in beings in an orderly manner to others. Therefore, it would be more fitting for us to honor God with silence than to exalt Him with such names, which are merely conceived by us and least of all touch Him in a real sense. These names neither possess nor can express anything of His truth in actual terms but are solely composed and distinguished by our abstraction from one another. Furthermore, such mental abstractions have no place in relation to God. For these names pertain to those things that are mutually related and heterogeneous, yet all directed toward a common genus and in alignment with their adaptations and distinctions. But God is neither under any genus nor a genus of such a kind. If, then, the name of justice or philanthropy in God signifies some reality, which it is designated to signify

ἄλλο μὲν τι λογισθήσεται διὰ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐκεῖ νοούμενον εἶναι καὶ ὄν, ἄλλο δὲ τι διὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως; Εἰ δὲ διοίσουσιν οὕτως ἀλλήλων ἐκεῖ, καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν, ἐν ἣ καὶ περὶ ἧς λέγονται, ὡς διάφορον ὁ ἕκαστον λογισθήσεται ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὴ τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦμεν φιλάνθρωπον, ἐπισυνάπτοντες δ' αὖ καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν. Καὶ σύνεστι μὲν ταῦτα τῷ Θεῷ εἰπεῖν, ὡς δὴ τοιοῦτον δέον τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι καὶ πάντα ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἐπεισοδιώδη οὐδὲ ποτὲ μὲν ὄντα, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄντα νοοῦμεν ταῦτ' ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι· χωρὶς μέντοι νοοῦμεν τὸ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, ἐπειδὴν περὶ τούτου δέη σκοπεῖν· χωρὶς δὲ δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ φιλάνθρωπον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τελειοτήτων σκοπῶμεν, καὶ συνάπτοντες οὐδὲν ἦττον ὑφ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδίον τι πράγμα νοοῦμεν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἐμπράκτως αὐτοῖς ἀνταποκρινόμενον· καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἡ θεία φιλανθρωπία οὐκ ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὖ οὐ χωρὶς φιλανθρωπίας, καὶ σοφὴ μὲν ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἀγαθὴ δὲ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, τῆς ἄκρας ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος, ἀπλότητός τε καὶ ἀπειρίας τοῦτ' ἀπαιτούσης· ἴδιον μέντοι λόγον ἀληθῶς ἔχουσιν ἕκαστον, τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνοντα, τῷ δ' ἐκάστου λόγῳ ἀνταποκρινομένου τινὸς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ πράγματος, τοῖς πράγμασιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπαληθεύονται λόγοι· κἀντεῦθεν ἔστιν, ὅτι καὶ ἰδίως μὲν αὐτοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἰδίως δὲ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας πειρώμεθα· καὶ ἰδίως μὲν τῆς ῥάβδου, ἰδίως δὲ τῆς βακτηρίας, ὡς δυοῖν οὐσῶν κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Δαυῖδ· διὸ καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δεόμεθα μὴ τῇ θείᾳ δικαιοσύνῃ κριθῆναι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ θείᾳ μᾶλλον φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ὡς ἄλλο τι οὐσης ἐκατέρας ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καθ' αὐτήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἄλλο πρᾶττούσης, ὥσπερ καὶ φύσις ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ βούλησις πράγματι διενηνόχῃ.

fittingly in those who participate in it according to their nature – and therefore such names are applied to signify thus (albeit there with a surpassing excellence, as has been stated, so that they are even more indicative there of works befitting God in a unique way) – how could they not differ in reality and truth as they pertain to themselves? How could one not think of one thing through philanthropy and another through justice, and likewise for the others? If they are thus distinct from one another in Him and in relation to the divine essence, in which and concerning which they are spoken, then each will be considered distinct in reality and truth. For we do not call God philanthropic arbitrarily, nor do we then call Him just by mere addition. And it accords with God to say such things of Him, as it is fitting for God to possess such attributes entirely. Therefore, we do not consider these things episodic or alternately present and absent in Him. Yet, we distinguish conceptually between the being of God when inquiry turns to His essence and His being just or philanthropic when we investigate divine energies and perfections. And in each of the names, we also conceive truly and actively a specific reality corresponding to them. Divine philanthropy does not exist apart from justice, nor justice apart from philanthropy. Goodness is wise, and wisdom is good; the same applies similarly to the other attributes. This is demanded by the supreme perfection, simplicity, and infinity in Him. Yet each truly possesses its own distinct rational account signifying its essence, and to each rational account corresponds some reality in God. The accounts concerning them are verified by the realities, from which it follows that we speak distinctively of His justice and philanthropy. Similarly, we distinguish the rod and the staff as two things,

Διὸ καὶ ἔργον μὲν τῆς θείας φύσεως αἱ προαγόμεναι ὑποστάσεις ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρός συμφυῶς αὐτῷ καὶ συναϊδίως, ἔργα δὲ τῆς θελήσεως αὐτοῦ τὰ κτίσματα, ἧς μιᾶς οὔσης ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσι, καὶ εἰς δημιουργὸς τῶν κτισμάτων αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις καὶ εἰς εἰσι Θεός. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν ἦν ἐκεῖ πάντη φύσις καὶ βούλησις, τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ μόνη περὶ αὐτῶν νοήσει διακρινόμενον, τῇ ὑστάτῃ αὐτῶν καὶ κτιστῇ, μάτην ἂν ἀπεδείκνυμεν τὰς προαγομένας ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑποστάσεις διενηνοχένας τῶν κτισμάτων, ὡς ἐκ τῆς θείας φύσεως προαγομένας ἐκείνας, τούτων ἐκ τῆς θείας παραγομένων θελήσεως. Ἔργω τοίνυν καὶ πράγματι ἡ τούτων ἔστιν ἐκεῖ διάκρισις. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ σύνθεσιν αὕτη τῶν θείων ἐνεργειῶν, αἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασι σημαίνονται τούτοις, ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἡ πρὸς τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν, ἧς εἰσιν αἱ ἐνέργειαι, τοῦτο τῆς κατὰ τὴν θείαν ἀπλότητα καὶ ἀπειρίαν ὑπερβολῆς ἔστιν· οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ τοῦτο τὴν πραγματικὴν ἐν ταῖς θείαις ἐνεργείαις ἀλήθειαν, ἡ τὸ τῆς διακρίσεως ἀληθὲς ἔπεται, δεῖ παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖν, ὡς λόγῳ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ διακρινόμενων, οὐκ ἔργῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρα καὶ ἀναφοραῖς τε καὶ ιδιότησι πραγματικῶς ἐνθεωρουμέναις αὐτῷ κἀντεῦθεν ὑφισταμένοις προσώποις διακρινόμενος ὁ Θεός, οὐδὲν ἥττον εἰς ἔστι τῇ φύσει, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διακεκριμένων ἐν ὄντων τῇ φύσει, εἰ καὶ ἡ τοιαῦτα πραγματικῶς διακρίνονται, καίτοι τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα μᾶλλον τῷ ἔργῳ διακρίνονται ἢ ἡμεῖς νῦν φαμέν τὰς θείας ἐνεργείας ἀλλήλων τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν φύσιν διακεκρίσθαι. Ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀντιθετικῶς εἴτουν ἀναφορικῶς διακρίνονται· ἐνταῦθα δὲ σὺν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀντιθέσει· καὶ εἰ μὴ πράγματά εἰσιν αἱ θεῖαι ἐνέργειαι, ὡς αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ πράγματός εἰσι κἀν τῷ πράγματι. Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ μείζων καὶ ἰσχυροτέρα διάκρισις τὴν θείαν ἐνότητα διὰ τὴν

according to the divine David. Thus, we ask not to be judged by divine justice but rather by divine philanthropy, since each, in God, is distinct in itself and therefore acts differently toward what is external. Just as nature and will in Him differ in reality, so too do justice and philanthropy. The hypostases proceeding from God the Father, inherently and co-eternally united with Him, are indeed works of the divine nature. But the creatures are works of His will, which is singular within the three hypostases, whereby the three hypostases are jointly the Creator of the creatures and one God. If nature and will were absolutely the same in Him, being distinguished only by our ultimate and created comprehension, we would futilely demonstrate that the hypostases proceeding from the Father differ from the creatures, as the former proceed from the divine nature and the latter from the divine will. Therefore, their distinction exists in actuality and reality. Yet, if this distinction of the divine energies signified by these names neither composes nor conflicts with one another or with the divine essence, of which they are energies, this is due to the supreme simplicity and infinity of the divine. Nonetheless, this does not negate the real truth within the divine energies or the reality of their distinction. They are not separated merely by reason and conceptualization rather than reality, as God is also truly distinguished by the properties and relations that are observed as realities in Him and accordingly produce the hypostases. God, therefore, remains one in essence despite the distinctions within Him being unified in essence, even if such distinctions are real. Indeed, the divine persons are more truly distinct in actuality than we now claim the divine energies to be distinct both among themselves and in relation to the divine essence. For the hypostases are

ἄκρην ἀπλότητα καὶ ἀπειρίαν οὐ παραβλάπτει, πῶς ἢ ἐλάττων αὕτη διάκρισις αἰτία συνθέσεως ἔσται, οὐδενὸς τῶν πρὸς τὴν σύνθεσιν ζητουμένων ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ διακρίσει χώρην ἔχοντος; Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄμφω πραγματικαὶ αἱ διακρίσεις πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν τῶν ἐπινοία μόνον ἡμετέρα διακρινομένων, τῇ δὲ ἀντιθέσει καὶ μὴ ἀντιθέσει διενηνόχατον.

6. Συμπεραίνοντες τοίνυν φαμέν, ὡς ἐκάστη τῶν θείων ἐνεργειῶν, αἱ τοῖς οἰκείοις δηλοῦνται ὀνόμασιν, πρᾶγμα ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, οὐ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ἔννοιαν καθ' ἣν φαμέν ἐκάστην τῶν θείων ὑποστάσεων πρᾶγμα εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγομεν τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν πρᾶγμα εἶναι, ὅς ἐστι τρόπος τοῦ πράγματος ἰσχυρότερος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λεπτοτέραν τοῦ πράγματος ἔννοιαν, ὅτι δηλονότι τί τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι καὶ τῷ πράγματι, πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν δευτέρων νοητῶν, ἅπερ ἐπίνοια καὶ ὄντα τοῦ λόγου λέγονται καὶ εἰσιν, οὐ τοῦ πράγματος, ὡς ἔργα μᾶλλον ὄντα τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου καὶ σοφοῦ νοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐκάστη τῶν θείων ἐνεργειῶν πρᾶγμα τί ἐστιν οὕτως ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀπλουστάτῳ πράγματι τῇ θείᾳ οὐσίᾳ, ἕτερος δὲ ἐκάστης λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλῶν, εὐλόγως ἄρα καὶ τῷ πράγματι διακρίνονται ἀλλήλων, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλήλων μόνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς θείας οὐσίας αὐτῆς, τοῦ κοινοῦ μὲν αὐταῖς, ἀπλουστάτου δὲ καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν χρήματος, ἔργῳ τε καὶ εἰδικῶς, ταῦτόν δ' εἰπεῖν, τῷ τί ἐστι διακρίνονται, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίας μόνης ἔστιν αὐτοῖς

distinguished oppositely and relationally; whereas in the case of energies, no opposition exists. And if the divine energies are not realities like the three hypostases, they nonetheless pertain to reality and exist within reality. If, therefore, the greater and stronger distinction does not harm the divine unity due to its utmost simplicity and infinity, how can this lesser distinction be the cause of synthesis, with none of the factors for synthesis having any place in such a distinction? Indeed, both distinctions are real in contrast to the distinction made only in our thought, and are distinguishable by opposition and non-opposition in a profound manner.

6. Therefore, we conclude that each of the divine energies, which are indicated by their proper names, is a reality in God, not in that sense in which we say each of the divine subsistences is a reality, nor even more so, as we say that the divine essence is a reality, which is a stronger mode of reality, but in a more subtle sense of reality, as it is clearly something of the reality even in the reality, in contrast to the second intentions, which are called and are thoughts and beings of reasons, not of the reality, as in act rather existing of the human and wise mind and existing in it. If therefore each of the divine energies is a reality in the one and simplest reality of the divine essence, and the essence of each is the account which expresses what it was to be, it is reasonable that they are distinguished from each other in the reality, and not only from each other, but also from the divine essence itself, having in common with them the same, but in greater richness and with them, wealth, both in work and in particular; to say the same, they are distinguished by what they are, not merely by our thought alone, but by the practical and determined truth, or

τὸ διακεκρίσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἐμπράκτου καὶ διωρισμένης ἀληθείας, ἣ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτων ἀνταποκρίνεται ἐν Θεῷ. Διὸ καὶ οἱ λόγῳ μόνῳ, τουτέστιν ἐπινοίᾳ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, ταῦτα διακρίνεσθαι λέγοντες, ἀμαρτάνουσι. Δεῖ μέντοι γε τὴν πραγματικὴν ἐν τούτοις διάκρισιν συνεσταλμένως νοεῖν ὃν εἴρηται τρόπον, κὰν τῷ μετριοτέρῳ βαθμῷ τῶν πολυειδῶν τοῦ πράγματος διακρίσεων· αἱ πλεῖσται γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι διακρίσεις οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι οἰκείως τῇ περὶ Θεοῦ πιστευομένῃ καλῶς ἀπλότητι. Αὐτῷ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας· ἀμήν:

these correspond in God to their names. Therefore, those who say that these are distinguished only by thought, that is, by human reasoning, err. However, it is necessary to understand the real distinction in these in a restrained manner, as it has been said, even in the more moderate degree of the manifold distinctions of reality; for most of them, and stronger distinctions, would not properly suit the well-believed simplicity concerning God. To Him be glory forever; Amen.