

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑΙ

- 1^a I. Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἂν γάρ τις ἀποδιδῶ τί ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῶω εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινόν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς κοινῶ ὀνόματι προσ-
 5 αγορεύεται ζῶον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον, τί ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῶω εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει. παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦνομα

^a I retain the traditional renderings, 'univocal,' namely, and 'equivocal.' The ordinary reader, I suspect, will be little familiar with the former. He may, if he pleases, substitute such terms as 'ambiguous,' 'unambiguous.' 'Univocal' has the advantage of being a *positive* term.

^b Ζῶον in Greek had two meanings, that is to say, living

ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

I. Things are equivocally^a named, when they have the name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly both be called 'animals,' these are equivocally named.^b For they have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For if you are asked to define what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that case alone.

Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the name means the same in each case—has the same definition corresponding. Thus a man and an ox are called 'animals.' The name is the same in both cases ; so also the statement of essence. For if you are asked what is meant by their both of them being called 'animals,' you give that particular name in both cases the same definition.

Things are 'derivatively' named that derive their own name from some other, that is given a new verbal

creature, and, secondly, a figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture. We have no ambiguous noun. However, we use the word 'living' of portraits to mean 'true to life.'

- 1^a προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ
 15 γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

II. Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

- 20 Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐστίν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐστίν· τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστίν, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὃ ἐν τινι
 25 μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν), οἷον ἢ τις γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστίν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δ' οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τι λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν τῷ σώματι ἐστίν (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι), καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· τὰ δὲ καθ' ὑπο-
 1^b κειμένου τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστίν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ τις ἵππος·
 5 οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται. ἀπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα

* 'Courageous man,' 'courage,' in Greek. But the former obscures the real point by consisting of two words in English. By 'a new verbal form' is intended a new termination or inflexion.

CATEGORIES, I-II

form, as, for instance, 'grammarian' from 'grammar,' from 'heroism,' 'hero,' and so on.^a

II. We may or we may not combine what we call words, expressions and phrases. Combine them; you have propositions—for instance, 'man runs' or 'man wins'—while examples of uncombined forms are 'man,' 'ox,' 'runs' and 'wins' and the like.

But as for the things that are *meant*, when we thus speak of uncombined words, you can predicate some of a subject, but they never are present in one. You can predicate 'man,' for example, of this or that man as the subject, but man is not found in a subject. By 'in,' 'present,' 'found in a subject' I do not mean present or found as its parts are contained in a whole; I mean that it cannot exist as apart from the subject referred to. And then there is that class of things which are present or found in a subject, although they cannot be asserted of any known subject whatever. A piece of grammatical knowledge is there in the mind as a subject but cannot be predicated of any known subject whatever. Again, a particular whiteness is present or found in a body (all colour implies some such basis as what we intend by 'a body') but cannot itself be asserted of any known subject whatever. We find there are some things, moreover, not only affirmed of a subject but present also in a subject. Thus knowledge, for instance, while present in this or that mind as a subject, is also asserted of grammar. There is, finally, that class of things which can neither be found in a subject nor yet be asserted of one—this or that man or horse, for example. For nothing of that kind is in or is ever affirmed of a subject. More generally speaking, indeed, we can never affirm of a subject what is in its

^{1 b} καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἓνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τις γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστί.¹

III. Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ' ἑτέρου κατηγορηται ὡς
¹⁰ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῶον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ οὖν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῶον· ὁ γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀνθρωπὸς
¹⁵ ἐστί καὶ ζῶον.

Τῶν ἐτέρων γενῶν² καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῶου καὶ ἐπιστήμης· ζῶου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραί, τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ εὐδρόν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει
²⁰ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι.

Τῶν δέ γε ὑπ' ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι· τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι, τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.

²⁵ IV. Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἥτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτέ ἢ κείσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ

¹ Bekker reads τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἐστί, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται.

² τῶν ἐτερογενῶν B.

^a 'Co-ordinate' is literally in Greek 'not arranged the one under the other.' The differentia added to the genus constitutes what is known as the species. Supposing that

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nature individual and also numerically one. Yet in some cases nothing prevents its being *present* or *found* in a subject. Thus a piece of grammatical knowledge is present, as we said, in a mind.

III. A word upon predicates here. When you predicate this thing or that of another thing as of a subject, the predicates then of the predicate will also hold good of the subject. We predicate 'man' of a man; so of 'man' do we predicate 'animal.' Therefore, of this or that man we can predicate 'animal' too. For a man is both 'animal' and 'man.'

When genera are co-ordinate and different, differentiae will differ in kind.^a Take the genera, animal and knowledge. 'Footed,' 'two-footed,' 'winged,' 'aquatic' are among the differentiae of animal. But none will be found to distinguish a particular species of knowledge. No species of knowledge will differ from another in being 'two-footed.'

Where the genera, however, are subordinate, nothing whatever prevents them from having the same differentiae. For we predicate the higher or larger of the smaller or subordinate class. The differentiae, then, of the predicate will also belong to the subject.

IV. Each uncombined word or expression means one of the following things:—what (or Substance), how large (that is, Quantity), what sort of thing (that is, Quality), related to what (or Relation), where (that is, Place), when (or Time), in what attitude (Posture, Position), how circumstanced (State or Condition), how active, what doing (or Action), how passive,

'building' is the genus and 'used for a dwelling' the difference, we then have the species called 'house.'

ARISTOTLE

- ^{1 b} πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἶον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἶον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἶον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρὸς τι δὲ
^{2 a} οἶον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μείζον· ποῦ δὲ οἶον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἶον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κείσθαι δὲ οἶον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἶον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἶον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἶον τέμνεται, καίεται.

Ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ
⁵ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται,¹ τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται. ἅπαντα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἧτοι ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε
¹⁰ ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἶον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

V. Οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρῶτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἶον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος. δευτέραι δὲ οὐσῖαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἶδεσιν αἱ πρῶτως οὐσῖαι λεγόμεναι
¹⁵ ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἶον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἶδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον·

¹ ἢ ἀποφάσει omitted after λέγεται.

* I give here two versions of each category. The Greek as a rule is more concrete than the customary English translations. The reader may here be referred to Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (translated by G. G. Berry), vol. iv. c. 4.

^b "Asserted of a subject" here refers to the relation of universal to particular, "present in a subject" to that of an attribute to its possessor' (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 23). The distinction is the same as that into essential and

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what suffering (Affection).^a Examples, to speak but in outline, of Substance are 'man' and 'a horse,' of Quantity 'two cubits long,' 'three cubits in length' and the like, of Quality 'white' and 'grammatical.' Terms such as 'half,' 'double,' 'greater' are held to denote a Relation. 'In the market-place,' 'in the Lyceum' and similar phrases mean Place, while Time is intended by phrases like 'yesterday,' 'last year' and so on. 'Is lying' or 'sitting' means Posture, 'is shod' or 'is armed' means a State. 'Cuts' or 'burns,' again, indicates Action, 'is cut' or 'is burnt' an Affection.

Not one of these terms in itself will involve any positive statement. Affirmations, as also denials, can only arise when such terms are combined or united together. Each positive or negative statement must either be true or be false—that, at least, is allowed on all hands—but an uncombined word or expression (for instance, 'man,' 'white,' 'runs' or 'conquers') can neither be true nor be false.

V. Substance in the truest and strictest, the primary sense of that term, is that which is neither asserted of nor can be found in a subject.^b We take as examples of this a particular man or a horse. But we *do* speak of secondary substances—those within which, being species, the primary or first are included, and those within which, being genera, the species themselves are contained. For instance, a particular man we include in the species called 'man' and the species itself in its turn is included in the genus called accidental predicates. Aristotle under substance distinguishes, first of all, primary substance, that is to say, the individual (or this or that man, for example), and, secondly, secondary substances, that is, the species and genera in which the individuals are included

²^a δεύτεραι οὖν αὐται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῶον.

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ' ὑπο-
²⁰ κειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ
 τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς
 ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖται γε τοῦνομα· τὸν γὰρ
 ἄνθρωπον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις. καὶ
 ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν-
²⁵ θρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ
 ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῶον. ὥστε καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ
 ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται.

Τῶν δ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν
 πλείστων οὔτε τοῦνομα οὔθ' ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖ-
 ται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοῦνομα μὲν
³⁰ οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαι ποτε τοῦ ὑποκει-
 μένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν
 ὑποκειμένῳ ὃν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑπο-
 κειμένου (λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται), ὁ δὲ λόγος
 ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ σώματος κατηγορη-
 θήσεται.

Τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέ-
³⁵ γεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις
 αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ φανερόν ἐκ τῶν καθ'
 ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων, οἷον τὸ ζῶον κατὰ τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ
 τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῶον· εἰ γὰρ
²^b κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ

^a Understand by 'the name' here τὸ λευκόν, and not the Greek substantive λευκότης; both of them signified 'whiteness.' So also we use 'white' in English as an

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‘animal.’ These, then, are secondary substances, that is to say, man and animal—otherwise, species and genus.

From what we have said it is plain that the name and definition of the predicates can both be affirmed of the subject. For instance, we predicate ‘man’ of an individual man as the subject. The name of the species called ‘man’ is asserted of each individual; you predicate ‘man’ of *a* man. The definition or meaning of ‘man’ will apply to *a* man, in like manner, for a man is both man and an animal. The name and definition of the species will thus both apply to the subject.

When we come, on the contrary, to things which are present or found in a subject, we find that their names and definitions we cannot, at least in most cases, affirm or predicate of that subject. Indeed, the definition itself will in no case whatever apply. But in some cases nothing prevents us from using the *name* of the subject. Suppose we take ‘white’ as an instance. Now ‘white’ is, no doubt, in a body and thus is affirmed of a body, for a body, of course, is called ‘white.’ The definition, however, of ‘white’—of the colour, that is, we call ‘white’—can never be predicated of any such body whatever.^a

Everything else but first substance is either affirmed of first substance or present in such as its subject. This is evident from particular instances taken by way of examples. We predicate ‘animal’ of ‘man.’ So we predicate ‘animal’ also of any particular man. Were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could adjective, commonly speaking, but also at times as a noun, when it means ‘a white paint’ or ‘white colour.’

^{2 b} ἀνθρώπου ὅλως. πάλιν τὸ χρώμα ἐν σώματι· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως. ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἦτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. μὴ οὐσιῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῶ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος
¹⁰ ἀποδιδούς ἢ περ τὸ γένος, οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδούς γνωριμώτερον ἢ ἀποδοίῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον ἀποδιδούς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον. καὶ τὸ τι δένδρον ἀποδιδούς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδούς ἢ φυτόν.

¹⁵ Ἔτι αἱ πρώται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται. ὥς δέ γε αἱ πρώται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει.
²⁰ τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἶδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία.

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not be affirmed of the species. Colour, again, is in body ; so also in this or that body. For were there no bodies existing wherein it could also exist, it could not be in body at all. In fine, then, all things whatsoever, save what we call primary substances, are predicates of primary substances or present in such as their subjects. And were there no primary substance, nought else could so much as exist.

Of secondary substances species is better called substance than genus : it is nearer to primary substance, while genus is more removed from it. Suppose someone asks you ' what is it ? ' regarding a primary substance. Your answer is both more instructive and also more apt to the subject, provided you mention its species than if you should mention its genus. Take this or that man, for example. You would give a more instructive account, if you stated the species or ' man,' than you would, if you called him ' an animal.' The former belongs the more to him, the latter is somewhat too wide. Or, again, take an individual tree. By mentioning the species or ' tree ' you will give a more instructive account than by giving the genus or ' plant.'

Moreover, the primary substances most of all merit that name, since they underlie all other things, which in turn will be either their predicates or present in such as their subjects. But exactly as primary substances stand to all else that exists, so also stands species to genus. Species is related to genus as subject is related to predicate. We predicate genus of species ; but never, indeed, can we predicate species of genus conversely. On this further ground we may hold that of secondary substances species is more truly substance than genus.

2 b

Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐστὶ γένη, οὐδὲν
 μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
 οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσεις κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου
 25 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδούς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου
 τὸν ἵππον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν
 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν
 γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τις βοῦς.

30 Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν
 ἄλλων τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσῖαι λέγον-
 ται· μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατ-
 ηγορουμένων. τὸν γὰρ τινα ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἀποδιδῶ-
 τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδούς
 οἰκειῶς ἀποδώσει καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρω-
 πον ἢ ζῶον ἀποδιδούς· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὁ τι ἄν-
 35 ἀποδιδῶ τις, ἄλλοτρίως ἐστὶ ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον
 λευκόν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς.
 ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσῖαι λέ-
 γονται.

3 a Ἐτι αἱ πρώται οὐσῖαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν
 ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσῖαι λέγονται. ὥς δέ γε
 αἱ πρώται οὐσῖαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν,
 οὕτω τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς
 τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ
 λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται. τὸν γὰρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς
 6 γραμματικόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῶον γραμ-
 ματικόν ἐρεῖς. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑπο-
 κειμένῳ εἶναι. ἢ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε ἐν

CATEGORIES, v

If we turn to the species themselves, none, unless it is also a genus, is more of a substance than another. No apter description is 'man' of a concrete or individual man than is 'horse' of a concrete horse. So also of primary substances—none is more a substance than others. For this or that man, for example, could not well be *more truly* substance than, let us say, this or that ox.

Apart, then, from primary substances, species and genus alone of the things that will then remain over are rightly called secondary substance, for they of all possible predicates alone define primary substance. For only by species or genus can this or that man be defined in a fit or appropriate way; and we make our definition preciser by stating the species or 'man' than by stating the genus or 'animal.' Anything else we might state, as, for instance, 'he runs' or 'is white,' would be foreign from the purpose in hand. So species and genera only are rightly designated as substance, first substances only excepted.

'Substance,' again, strictly speaking, applies to first substances only, because they not only underlie but provide all things else with their subjects. Exactly as primary substance is related to all else whatever, so also are genus and species, in which is included that substance, related to all attributes not included in genus and species. For these are the subjects of such. You may call a man 'learned in grammar.' And, therefore, his species and genus, that is to say, man and animal, you may also call 'learned in grammar.' And this will be so in all cases.

That it never is present in a subject holds good of all substance whatever. For what we call primary

3^a ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται.
 τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φανερόν μὲν καὶ οὕτως
 10 ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος
 καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται,
 ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ
 ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ζῶον καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς
 ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀν-
 15 θρώπῳ. ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν
 ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαι ποτε τοῦ ὑπο-
 κειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον. τῶν δὲ δευτέρων
 οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑπο-
 κειμένου καὶ τοῦνομα· τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον
 κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις, καὶ τὸν
 20 τοῦ ζώου ὡσαύτως. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ οὐσία
 τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

Οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ
 διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ
 πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν ἢ τὸ πεζόν. καὶ
 25 ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς διαφορᾶς, καθ' οὗ
 ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά, οἷον εἰ τὸ πεζόν κατὰ τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ πεζοῦ κατ-
 ηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος.

Μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὥς
 ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μὴ ποτε ἀναγκασ-
 30 θῶμεν οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω
 τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὥς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα
 ἐν τινι.

CATEGORIES, v

substance can neither be present in a subject nor yet predicated of one. And as for the secondary substance, the following points, among others, will prove it is not in a subject. We predicate 'man' of a man; 'man,' however, is not *in* a subject. For manhood is not *in* a man. As the species, so also the genus. For 'animal' is also asserted of this or that man in particular but cannot be found present in him. Again, we may notice this point. When a thing can be found in a subject, then nothing prevents us from using its name of the subject in question; not so the definition, however. And yet of a secondary substance both name and definition hold good in the case of the subject as well. The definition of the species (or man) and that of the genus (or animal) are used of an individual man. Therefore, substance is not in a subject.

That they cannot be present in subjects is true not of substances only but holds of differentiae, too. Thus we can of the species called 'man' assert 'going on foot' and 'two-footed.' But these are not found present in it. For neither of these is *in* man. Where, again, you affirm the differentia, you also affirm its definition. Suppose of the species called 'man' you should predicate 'going on foot.' The definition also of that attribute then will apply to that species. For 'man' does, indeed, go on foot.

That the parts of the substances are present or found in the wholes as in subjects is a fact that need hardly disturb us or render us fearful of having to brand all such parts as no substances. Did we not qualify 'present in a subject' by 'not as the parts in a whole'?^a

^a See the definition, 1 a 24.

- ^{3 a} Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ
 πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι. πᾶσαι γὰρ
⁸⁵ αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων
 κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν. ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ
 τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία· κατ'
 οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται· τῶν δὲ δευτέρων
 οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγο-
 ρεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ κατὰ
^{8 b} τοῦ ἀτόμου. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ κατὰ
 τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται.
 καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται αἱ πρῶται οὐσῖαι
 τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος δὲ
 τὸν τοῦ γένους· ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου
⁵ λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθή-
 σεται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον
 ἐπιδέχεται τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ ἅτομα. συνώνυμα δέ
 γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοῦνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός,
 ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν
 διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.
- ¹⁰ Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ
 μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ
 ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἀτομον γὰρ καὶ
 ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευ-
 τέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι
¹⁵ τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ
 ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῶον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 ποιόν τι σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ εἶν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παλλῶν ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶον. οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ
 ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν. οὐδὲν γὰρ
²⁰ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκόν ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν. τὸ δὲ εἶδος

CATEGORIES, v

Differentia and substance alike have this characteristic in common, that, wherever we predicate them, we predicate them univocally. For such propositions have always individuals or species for subjects. The primary substance, no doubt, being never predicated of anything, never itself can be predicate of any proposition whatever. Not so with the secondary substance. The species is predicated of all individual examples, the genus of these and the species. And so with differentiae also. Of species and individuals we predicate these in like manner. Both definitions, moreover, or those of the genus and species, apply to the primary substance and that of the genus to the species. For all we affirm of the predicate will also be affirmed of the subject. The definition of each differentia applies in a similar manner to both individuals and species. But, as we have already noticed, univocal is used of such things as not only possess the same name but are also defined the same way. Hence it follows that in all propositions having substance or difference for predicate that predicate is quite unequivocal.

All substance appears individual. And this is indisputably true in the case of the primary substances. What each denotes is a unit. In that of the secondary substances language may make it appear so, as when we say 'animal,' 'man.' This, however, is not really so, for a quality rather is meant. Second substance is not one and single, as, no doubt, the primary is; not of one but of many, indeed, do we predicate 'animal,' 'man.' Species and genus, however, do not merely indicate quality, as 'white' merely indicates quality. Accidents, that is, like 'white,' mean a quality simply and merely. But species

3^b καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει· ποῖαν
 γὰρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει. ἐπὶ πλείον δὲ τῷ γένει
 ἢ τῷ εἶδει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται· ὁ γὰρ ζῶον
 εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλείον περιλαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
 25 Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς
 ἐναντίον εἶναι. τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσία τί ἂν εἴη
 ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ τινὶ ζῳῳ;
 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον. οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
 ἢ τῷ ζῳῳ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ
 τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν,
 οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ· τῷ γὰρ διπλήχει ἢ τριπλήχει
 30 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τοῖς δέκα, οὐδέ τῶν
 τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ τις τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη
 ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τῶν δὲ
 ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
 τὸ ἥττον. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι
 35 μᾶλλον οὐσία καὶ ἥττον οὐσία (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ
 εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν), ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ'
 ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. οἷον εἰ
 ἔστιν αὕτη¹ ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον
 καὶ ἥττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος
 ἑτέρου· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄν-
 4^aθρωπος, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἥττον λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
 μᾶλλον καλὸν καὶ ἥττον λέγεται. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ
 αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα
 λευκὸν ὃν μᾶλλον λευκὸν εἶναι λέγεται νῦν ἢ
 5 πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὃν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἥττον
 λέγεται. ἡ δὲ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον

¹ αὕτη B.

CATEGORIES, v

and genus determine a quality in reference to substance. They tell you *what sort* of a substance. In the case of the genus, however, such determining qualification will cover a much wider field than it does in the case of the species. Say 'animal'; you comprehend more than you would, if instead you said 'man.'

Substances never have contraries. How could first substances have them—this man, for example, that animal? Nothing is contrary to them. And species and genus have none. This particular characteristic belongs not to substance alone. For it holds of a good many things and, among them, for instance, of quantity. 'Two cubits long' has no contrary; neither has 'three cubits long'; nor has 'ten' nor yet anything like it, unless, indeed, someone should say 'large' and 'small,' 'much' and 'little' are contraries. Definite quantities, however, can certainly never have contraries.

No substance, it seems, has degrees or admits of a more and a less. I do not mean here that one substance may not be more truly called substance, less truly called substance, than others; indeed, we have said that it may. But I mean that no substance as such can admit of degrees in itself. For example, the same substance, man, cannot really be more or less man as compared with himself or another. This man is not *more* man than that, as one white thing is more or less white than another white object may be or, again, as one beautiful object has more or less beauty than others. The same quality in the same object may vary at times in degree. For example, a body, if white, is called whiter just now than it was or, if warm, is called more or less warm. But a substance is not more or less of whatever, *qua*

- ^{4 a} λέγεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδέ γε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἔστιν οὐσίαι. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.
- 10 Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις τὸ τοιοῦτο προενεγκεῖν, ὅσα μὴ εἰσιν οὐσίαι, ὃ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὃ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ
- 15 ἔσται λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδ' ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἔσται φαῦλη καὶ σπουδαία· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μὴ εἰσιν οὐσίαι. ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ἀριθμῷ ὃν δεκτικόν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος,
- 20 εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν, ὅτε μὲν λευκὸς ὅτε δὲ μέλας γίνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρὸς, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ μὴ τις ἐνίσταται τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικά. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς εἶναι δοκεῖ,
- 25 οἷον εἰ ἀληθοῦς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ καθῆσθαι τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος λόγος ψευδοῦς ἔσται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· εἰ γὰρ τις ἀληθῶς δοξάζει τὸ καθῆσθαι τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν. εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν
- 30 αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ· ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἡλλοίωται γάρ) καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον

* True at one time and false at another.

CATEGORIES, v

substance, it is. For a man is not more of a man than he was at some time in the past. And so of all substances else. Therefore, substance can have no degrees.

But what is most characteristic of substance appears to be this : that, although it remains, notwithstanding, numerically one and the same, it is capable of being the recipient of contrary qualifications. Of things that are other than substance we could hardly adduce an example possessed of this characteristic. For instance, a particular colour, numerically one and the same, can in no wise be both black and white, and an action, if one and the same, can in no wise be both good and bad. So of everything other than substance. But substance, remaining the same, yet admits of such contrary qualities. One and the same individual at one time is white, warm or good, at another time black, cold or bad. This is not so with anything else, though it might be maintained that assertions or opinions admitted of contraries. That is to say, the same statement may appear to be both true and false.^a 'He sits' may, for instance, be true. If he rises, it then becomes false. And so with opinions as well. One may be of opinion, and truly, that such or such person is sitting. And yet, when that person has risen, that opinion, if held still, is false. Even though we allow this exception, it would differ, in fact, from the rest in its manner of coming about. For whenever a substance admits of such contrary qualifications, it is by a change in itself. It is by a change in itself that a thing that was hot becomes cold (having passed from one state to another) or a thing that was white becomes black or a thing that was good becomes bad.

^{4 a} ἐκ φαύλου. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναν-
 τίων δεκτικὸν ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ
 ✓ ³⁵ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντα πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ πράγ-
 ματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται.
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαι
^{4 b} τινα, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινηθέντος ὅτε μὲν ἀληθὲς
 ὅτε δὲ ψευδὲς λέγεται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
 δόξης. ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν
 ἐναντίων εἶναι.

Εἰ δὴ¹ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὸν λόγον καὶ
⁵ τὴν δόξαν δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ἀληθὲς τοῦτο. ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ
 αὐτὰ δέχεσθαι τι τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ
 λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγε-
 νῆσθαι. τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι
 τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς εἶναι λέγεται,
¹⁰ οὐ τῷ αὐτὸς δεκτικὸς εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀπλῶς
 γὰρ οὐθέν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε
 ἡ δόξα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων
 μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γινομένου πάθους. ἡ δὲ γε
 οὐσία τῷ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ
 τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι λέγεται· νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν
¹⁵ δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν· καὶ ἕκαστον
 τῶν τοιούτων αὐτῇ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι
 δεκτικὴ λέγεται. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ
 ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὄν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναν-
 τίων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς μεταβολήν. περὶ μὲν οὖν
 οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

²⁰ VI. Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ

¹ δέ B.

CATEGORIES, v-vi

And so, too, in all other cases where substance admits of such qualities. The statement or opinion, however, remains in itself quite unaltered in any and every respect. If it takes on the contrary quality, being now true and now false, then the facts of the case will have changed. For the statement 'he sits' is unchanged; but according to existing conditions we call it now true and now false. As with statements, so, too, with opinions. In its manner, then, of coming about it is really peculiar to substance to admit of the contrary qualities—to wit, by a change in itself.

If a man, then, should make an exception in favour of opinions and statements, maintaining that these admit also of contrary qualifications, his view would, in truth, be unsound. If opinions and statements are said to admit of such qualifications, the fact is that not they themselves but that *something else* undergoes change. For it is by the facts of the case, by their being or not being so, that a statement is called true or false. It is not that the statement itself can admit of such contrary qualities. For nothing, in one word, can alter the nature of opinions and statements, and, seeing no change occurs in them, they cannot admit of such contraries. But substance admits of such contraries by having received them itself: it alternately takes to itself health, disease, whiteness, blackness, the like. By receiving them into itself is it said to admit of such contraries. So, to conclude, we may call this above all distinctive of substance, that, remaining still one and the same, it may yet through a change in itself receive contrary qualifications. Let so much on substance suffice.

VI. To quantity let us turn next. This is either

⁴^b δὲ συνεχές, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἔχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἔχόντων θέσιν. ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχές δὲ οἷον γραμμή, ²⁵ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδεὶς ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ τὰ ³⁰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν ἔχοις ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ κοινὸν ὅρον λαβεῖν τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ διώρισται· ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ποσὸν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, φανερόν· καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ ³⁵ βραχεῖα καὶ μακρᾷ. λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λόγον γιγνόμενον. πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ⁴⁰ ἐκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν.

Ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχὴς ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμὴν, καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας γραμμὴν· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρὸς τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει. ⁴⁵ ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἃ τὰ

* These divisions are not co-extensive. Line, plane and solid and space are all called continuous quantities: all, too, consist of such parts as have interrelated positions. Time is a continuous quantity; its parts have, however, no

CATEGORIES, VI

discrete or continuous. Some quantities, moreover, consist of such parts as have relative positions in reference each to the others, while others, on the contrary, consist of such parts as have no such positions.^a Of quantities that are discrete we may here instance number and speech, of quantities that are continuous line, superficies and solid, to which time and place may be added. Consider the parts of a number. You find there is no common limit at which they may join or unite. For example, two fives will make ten. These, however, are wholly distinct; there is no common limit whatever at which these two fives coalesce. And the same with the parts three and seven. And, indeed, in the case of all numbers you never will find such a boundary, common to any two parts, for the parts remain ever distinct. Thus is number discrete, not continuous. The same may be said about speech, if by speech the spoken word is intended. Being measured in long and short syllables, speech is an evident quantity, whose parts possess no common boundary. No common limit exists, where those parts—that is, syllables—join. Each, indeed, is distinct from the rest.

A line is, however, continuous. Here we discover that limit of which we have just now been speaking. This limit or term is a point. So it is with a plane or a solid. Their parts also have such a limit—a line in the case of the former, a line or a plane in the latter.

positions in reference the one to the other. See the following from the summary by Waitz: ‘quod quantum est id vel discretum esse (numerus, oratio) vel continuum (linea, superficies, corpus; tempus, spatium) exemplis demonstratur,’ and ‘linea, superficies, corpus et spatium constant e partibus positionem quandam inter se habentibus, non ita numerus, tempus et oratio.’

- 5^a τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρὸς τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα. πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν συνεχῶν ἐστί· τόπον
- 10 γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατέχει, ἃ πρὸς τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια. ὥστε συνεχῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος· πρὸς γὰρ ἓνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.
- 15 Ἐτι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν, οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κείται που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι ὅπου ἕκαστον κείται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς ποῖον
- 20 μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀποδοθεῖ ἕκαστον οὐ κείται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ τοῦ τοποῦ. ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν
- 25 ἔχοι τις ἐπιδείξαι ὥς τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κείται που, ἢ ποῖά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων. οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου· ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων· ὁ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν
- 30 πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου τὸ δ' ὕστερον. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως τῷ τὸ ἐν πρότερον ἀριθμείσθαι τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν· καὶ οὕτω τάξιν τινὰ ἂν ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις ἂν.

CATEGORIES, vi

Again, time and space are continuous. Time is a whole and continuous; the present, past, future are linked. Space is also this kind of a quantity. For seeing the parts of a solid themselves occupy so much space and these parts have a limit in common, it follows the parts of space also, which those parts themselves occupy, have exactly the same common limit or term as the parts of the solid. As is time, so is space, then, continuous: the parts meet at one common boundary.

All quantities are made up of parts; and those parts, as we saw, have position in reference one to another or else they have no such position. The parts of a line, for example, must all have their relative places. Each, without doubt, must lie *somewhere*, and each can be clearly distinguished. You can say where each lies on the plane and to what sort of part it is next. So the parts of the plane have position: again you can say where each lies and to what sort of parts it is next. This is true, too, of solids and space. But the case of a number is different. You never could show that its parts are possessed of their relative places or even so much as have places. Nor could you determine which parts are contiguous or adjacent to which. And the same may be said of time also. For no part of time is enduring. And how can what does not endure well be said to have any position? Of time it were better to say that the parts have a relative order, since one part is prior to another. And so, in like manner, of number, for numbers are prior in the counting, as one prior to two, two to three. Thus of number also we may say that the parts have a relative order but certainly have no positions. This, also, will hold

good of speech, for the parts have no lasting existence. Pronounce them, and then they are gone, so that, since they pass out of existence, they cannot have place or position. Of quantities, then, to sum up, some consist of parts having position and others of parts that have not.

The things we have mentioned alone can be called in the strictest sense quantities. Other things that are so called are so called in a secondary sense—with an eye to some one of the former. To take an example or two. A white object is often called large, since the surface it covers is large, an action or process called long, since the time that it occupies is long. The name 'quantity' cannot be given to such things as of their own right. Someone asks you 'how long was that action?' You mention the time that it took, as 'it lasted a year' or the like. Someone asks you 'how large is that white thing?' You mention the surface it covers. As large as the surface it covers, so large, you will say, that white object. The things, then, referred to alone in themselves can be strictly called quantities; other things thus designated can only lay claim to that name, if at all, in a secondary sense—in a sort of derivative fashion and not from their intrinsic nature.

Quantities never have contraries. This will be perfectly clear in the case of all definite quantities, whereby I mean, for example, 'two cubits' or 'three cubits long' or a surface or something of that sort. These, it is clear, have no contraries. But possibly someone may say, 'great' and 'small,' 'much' and 'little' are contraries. These are, however, more properly regarded as terms of relation: *as such*, things are not great or small. They are so

5 b ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι, οἷον ὅρος μὲν
 μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν
 20 τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν
 ὁμογενῶν. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ
 εἶγε καθ' αὐτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγето, οὐκ ἂν
 ποτε τὸ μὲν ὅρος μικρὸν ἐλέγето, ἢ δὲ κέγχρος
 μεγάλη. πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ φαμέν πολλοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολ-
 25 λαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολ-
 λούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους
 ὄντας. ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἑκαστον
 τῶν τοιούτων ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν
 οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ
 ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν. ὥστε
 30 φανερόν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστιν.

Ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις ταῦτα ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε
 μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν· ὁ γὰρ
 μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον
 ἀναφέρεται, πῶς ἂν φαίη τις τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον;
 ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐναντία,
 35 συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι
 καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία. συμβαίνει γάρ
 ποτε ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι· ἔστι
 γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρὸν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα. ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ
 μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει.
 6 a ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδέν
 δοκεῖ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς
 οὐσίας· δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι,
 ἀλλ' οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει. ἀλλ' οὐδέ

by comparison only. Thus a hill is called small, a grain large ; but we really mean greater or smaller than similar things of the kind, for we look to some external standard. If such terms were used absolutely, we never should call a hill small, as we never should call a grain large. So, again, we may very well say that a village has many inhabitants, a city like Athens but few, though the latter are many times more ; or we say that a house contains many, while those in the theatre are few, though they greatly outnumber the others. While ' two cubits,' ' three cubits long ' and the like, therefore, signify quantity, ' great,' ' small ' and the like signify not a quantity but rather a relation, implying some external standard or something above and beyond them. The latter, then, plainly are relative.

Quantities, moreover, or not, there is nothing that is contrary to them. For what is not grasped by itself but referred to some external standard—how suppose that can have any contrary ? Secondly, suppose we allow ' great ' and ' small ' and the like to be contraries, then the same subject, it follows, at one and the same time admits of the contrary qualifications and things to themselves will be contrary. Does it not sometimes occur that the same thing is both great and small ? As compared with one thing, it is small ; it is great, as compared with another. And so the same thing simultaneously comes to be both great and small or at one and the same time admits of the contrary qualifications. But in dealing with substance we stated that nothing can thus simultaneously admit of such qualifications. Substance, no doubt, is receptive of contrary qualifications, but not in such way that a man at the same time is both

6^a λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἄμα. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων
 οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἄμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται. καὶ
 αὐτὰ δ' ἑαυτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι. εἰ γάρ
 ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν
 ἄμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἶη ἂν ἐναντίον.
 ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι τι
 ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ
 ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ. ὥστε εἰ καὶ
 10 μὴ τῶν πρὸς τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ,
 οὐδέν ἐναντίον ἔξει.

Μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν
 τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν. τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω
 ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω
 λέγοντες διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς
 15 τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. εἰκόασι δὲ καὶ τὸν
 τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὀρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπι-
 φέρειν· τὰ γὰρ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὀρίζονται.

20 Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον
 καὶ ἥττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕτερον
 ἐτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ. οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ,
 οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδέν μᾶλλον τὰ τρία,
 οὐδὲ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν. οὐδὲ χρόνος ἕτερος
 ἐτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος εἶναι λέγεται. οὐδ' ἐπὶ

* 'The extremities' apparently refers to the circumference taken as a whole.

^b The meaning I give to this sentence the context appears to require. But the text must, I think, be corrupt.

sick and healthy, a thing black and white simultaneously. Neither can anything else be at any time thus qualified. Then, if 'great,' 'small' and so forth were contrary, these to themselves would be contrary. Granted for argument's sake both that 'great' is the contrary of 'small' and that one and the same thing can be at the same moment both great and small, 'great' or 'small' to itself will be contrary. This is, however, impossible : nothing to itself can be contrary. Therefore, we cannot describe 'great' and 'small,' 'much' and 'little' as contraries. Neither could such terms have contraries, even though someone should call them terms not of relation but of quantity.

In dealing with space, the contention that quantity admits of a contrary seems to have most plausibility. 'Above' and 'below' are called contraries, when by 'below' what is meant is the region or space at the centre. This use is, however, derived from the view that we take of the world, since it is at the extremities of the world that the distance from the centre is the greatest.^a Indeed, in defining *all* contraries, we seem to have space in our minds. For we call those things contrary which, being also within the same class, are *most distant* the one from the other.

Quantities do not appear to admit of a more and a less. For example, take 'two cubits long.' Now, this never admits of gradations. A thing is not two cubits long in a greater degree than another. And so, in like manner, of numbers. One three is not, so to speak, three in a greater degree than another ; one five is not, so to speak, five in a greater degree than another.^b One period of time is, moreover, not more of a time than another. Nor of any other

^{6 a}
²⁵ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον λέγεται. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ
⁸⁰ ἄνισος. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐστὶ ποσά, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσα τε καὶ ἄνισα λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις οὐ πάνυ ἴση τε καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ,
⁸⁵ ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

VII. Πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μείζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μείζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς
^{6 b} γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις. πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι

* Aristotle here classifies as relatives two distinct classes of terms, those said 'to be of other things' and those said 'to be towards something else' (*ad aliquid*) 'in some other manner.' He means by the former all terms with a genitive dependent upon them. This distinction cannot be brought out in the same concise manner in English. There is no single form that will cover all the uses of the genitive in Greek. The Greek genitive, for instance, expresses not only our 'of' but our 'than.'

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quantity mentioned can a 'more' or a 'less' be affirmed. The category, therefore, of quantity in no wise admits of degrees.

What is really peculiar to quantities is that we compare or contrast them in terms or on grounds of equality. We predicate 'equal,' 'unequal,' of all of the quantities mentioned. One solid is equal to another, another, *per contra*, unequal. We use these terms also of time in comparing the periods of it. So also of all other quantities that we have previously mentioned. Of nothing, moreover, save quantities can we affirm these two terms. For we never say this disposition is 'equal' to that or 'unequal.' We say it is 'like' or 'unlike.' One quality—whiteness, for instance—is never compared with another in terms or on grounds of equality. Such things are termed 'like' and 'unlike.' Thus our calling something 'equal,' 'unequal,' is the mark, above all marks, of quantity.

VII. Let us now turn to Relation. We call a thing relative, when it is said to be such as it is from its being *of* some other thing or, if not, from its being related to something in some other way.^a Thus 'the greater' is said to be greater by reference to something outside it. For, indeed, when we call a thing 'greater,' we mean by that greater *than* something. 'The double' is called what it is from its being the double *of* something. For 'double' means double *of* something. And so with all terms of that kind. Other relatives also there are, such as habit, disposition, perception, position or attitude, knowledge. All these are explained by a reference to something to which they belong, and in no other way

- ^b λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι· ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις
⁶ λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ
 θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως. πρὸς
 τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι
 λέγεται, ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ὅρος
 μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον· πρὸς τι γὰρ μέγα
 λέγεται τὸ ὅρος· καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται,
¹⁰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρὸς τι
 λέγεται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ
 ἡ καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρὸς τι.
 τὸ δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἐστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν
 οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων
 θέσεων λέγεται.
- ¹⁵ Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, οἷον
 ἀρετὴ κακία ἐναντίον, ἐκάτερον ὃν τῶν πρὸς τι,
 καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοία. οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τι
 ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐναντίον· τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν
 ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων
 οὐδενί.
- ²⁰ Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι
 τὰ πρὸς τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον λέγεται, καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον λέγεται, ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τι ὃν· τό τε
 γὰρ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ
² ἀνόμοιον. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον διπλάσιον, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων
 οὐδέν.

Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται,
⁸ οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότης, δοῦλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ
 δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον
 ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ διπλασίου ἡμισυ,

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whatsoever. A habit is a habit *of* something, knowledge is knowledge *of* something, position position *of* something. We speak, then, of relative terms, when a thing's being such as it is is explained by a genitive following or else by some phrase or expression designed to bring out the relation. For instance, we call a hill 'large,' meaning large as compared with another. By such a comparison only it is that a hill is called 'large.' So we call a thing 'similar,' 'like'—'like' or 'similar' *to* something else. It is thus with all terms of that nature. This also we notice in passing : while lying and standing and sitting are really specific positions, position itself is a relative. To lie and to stand and to sit, these are not themselves really positions ; their names are, however, derived from the attitudes just now referred to.

Relatives sometimes have contraries. Virtue is contrary to vice, either term itself being a relative ; knowledge to ignorance also. By no means all relative terms can, however, be said to have contraries. 'Double' and 'triple' have none, nor, indeed, any terms of that sort.

Relatives also, it seems, may admit of degrees in some cases, as 'like,' 'unlike,' 'equal,' 'unequal,' which all may have 'more' or 'less' added, while each is a relative term. For by 'like' we mean like something else and by 'unlike' unlike something else. It is not the case, nevertheless, that *all* relatives admit of degrees. We do not say 'more' or 'less double,' and so with all terms of that kind.

All relatives have their correlatives. 'Slave' means the slave of a master, and 'master,' in turn, implies slave. 'Double' means double its half, just as 'half' means the half of its double. By 'greater,'

^{6 b} καὶ τὸ μείζον ἐλάττονος μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον
 μείζονος ἐλάττον. ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν
⁸⁵ λέξιν, οἷον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπι-
 στήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητόν, καὶ
 ἢ αἰσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἰσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
 αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.

Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν
 μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ, ἀλλὰ δι-
 αμάρτη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οἷον τὸ πτερόν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ
 ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ. οὐ γὰρ
 οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερόν ὄρνιθος· οὐ
^{7 a} γὰρ ἢ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερόν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἄλλ'
 ἢ πτερωτόν ἐστι· πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων περά
 ἐστίν, ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες. ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ
 οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερόν πτερωτοῦ
 πτερόν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῶ πτερωτόν.

^{8 b} Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον,
 ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ἢ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀπο-
 δοθεῖν, οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ,
 οὐκ οἰκεία ἢ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἢ πλοῖον,
¹⁰ ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται· ἐστὶ γὰρ πλοῖα
 ὧν οὐκ ἔστι πηδάλια. διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ
 γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον. ἀλλ'
 ἴσως οἰκειότερα ἂν ἢ ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως
 ἀποδοθεῖν, τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, ἢ
 ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται. καὶ ἀντι-
¹⁵ στρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδα-
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again, we mean greater than this or that thing which is less, by 'less' less than that which is greater. So it is with all relative terms. On occasions, however, the case or grammatical inflexion will differ. Knowledge is thus *of* the knowable; the knowable is knowable *by* knowledge. Perception is *of* the perceptible, which is perceived *by* perception.

At times the correlation, however, will not manifestly appear—namely, when a mistake has been made and the correlate itself wrongly stated. If you call a wing wing of a bird, then will no correlation appear; wing and bird are, I mean, not correlative. The wrong term was used at the outset in calling it wing *of a bird*. For the wing is the wing of a bird, when considered as *winged*, not as bird. Many other things, not birds, are winged. When, however, the right terms are used, the correlation will forthwith appear, as when, for example, we say that a wing is a wing of the winged and the winged thing is winged by a wing. Wing belongs to the winged of necessity.

At times there is no word in Greek that will rightly bring out the correlation. Then, I think, we must coin a new word. Let us take, for example, a rudder. We may say this belongs to a boat. 'To a boat' is, however, inappropriate and fails to bring out the correlation. Not, indeed, to the boat viewed as boat does the rudder belong of necessity. Are there not boats without rudders? Thus rudder and boat are not reciprocal. 'Boat' is not 'boat of a rudder,' as rudder is rudder of a boat. Since no proper term now exists, we must coin one to suit the occasion and speak with more accuracy thus—the rudder is rudder of 'the ruddered.' And, if we express ourselves thus, then at least will the terms be reciprocal. That is to

7^a λιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἢ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῶου ἀποδιδομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ζῶον, κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῶων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει. οὕτω δὲ ῥᾶστα ἂν ἴσως τις
 20 λάβοι οἷς μὴ κείται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτόν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.

Πάντα οὖν τὰ πρὸς τι, εἴαν περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ἐπεὶ εἴαν γε
 25 πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων, καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων, οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, εἴαν πρὸς τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δούλος εἴαν μὴ
 30 δεσπότην ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὄτου οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἢ ἀπόδοσις ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἴαν μὲν τι οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ἢ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστί, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τούτου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη
 85 οἰκείως, αἰὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ὁ δούλος εἴαν πρὸς δεσπότην λέγηται, περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δε-

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say, what is ruddered is ruddered by means of its rudder. So also in all other cases. A head will be better defined as correlative of that which is 'headed,' not, loosely, as head of an animal. Animals, simply as animals, do not have heads of necessity. Many, indeed, have no heads. We may thus, I think, best understand to what this or that thing is related, where no name at present exists, if we take the thing having a name and then, coining another name from it, apply it to the former's correlative just as we coined 'winged' and 'ruddered' above from the names 'wing' and 'rudder.'

Thus all relatives are referred to their correlates, provided they are rightly defined. I must add this proviso because, if the correlate happens to be stated in casual, inaccurate fashion, the terms cannot well be reciprocal. Let me explain what I mean. Even where the right names do exist and the things are admittedly correlates, no correlation appears, when we give one of these two a name that in no way brings out the relation and has some irrelevant meaning. Let 'slave' be defined in relation to 'man' or to 'biped' or what not, instead of its being defined (as it should be) by reference to 'master,' then no correlation appears, for the reference is really inaccurate. Again, let us grant that two things are correlative one with another and that the correct term is used for the purpose of stating the second. Although we remove all its other—I mean, its irrelevant—attributes, leaving that only in virtue of which it was called the correlative, then will the said correlation be, none the less, found to exist. The correlative of 'slave,' for example, is properly said to be 'master.' Suppose we remove all his other—I mean, his irre-

- 7^a σπότη, οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δε-
κτικῶ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου
τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, αἰεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ
7^b ῥηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότην δοῦλος λέγεται.
Ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὃ ποτε
λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, κατα-
λειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ
ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό. ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος
ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερόν ὄρνιθος, καὶ περιηρήσθω
8 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότην αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ
ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται· μὴ γὰρ
ὄντος δεσπότην οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως καὶ
τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιηρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῶ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ
ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερόν τῶν πρὸς τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος
πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερόν ἔσται τινός.
10 Ὡστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὃ ποτε οἰκείως
λέγεται. κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ἢ κείμενον, ῥαδία ἢ
ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως
ὀνοματοποιεῖν. οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων φανερόν
ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται.
15 Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι, καὶ
ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν. ἅμα γὰρ
διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἡμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὅντος
διπλάσιόν ἐστι· καὶ δεσπότην ὄντος δοῦλός ἐστι,
καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τού-
20 τοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ συναναίρει δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα·
μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλάσιον οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμισυ, καὶ
ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα. οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων
δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι ἀληθές δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει

levant—attributes, such as his being ‘two-footed,’ ‘receptive of knowledge’ or ‘human,’ and leave but his being ‘a master,’ then ‘slave’ will be still the correlative, ‘slave’ *meaning slave of a master*.

On the other hand, let us suppose one correlative named incorrectly. Then, if we strip off its attributes, saving that only in virtue of which it was called a correlative, all correlation will vanish. Let ‘a slave’ be defined as ‘a man’s’; let ‘a wing’ be defined as ‘a bird’s.’ Take the attribute ‘master’ from ‘man’: then, indeed, the correlation subsisting between ‘man’ and ‘slave’ will have vanished. No master, in short, then no slave. Take the attribute ‘winged’ from ‘the bird.’ Then the wing will no more be a relative: nought will there now be a wing of, the bird being no longer winged.

And so, to sum up, we must state all correlative terms with exactness. If a name is already to hand, then the statement will prove to be easy. If no name already exists, then I think it our duty to coin one. It is clear, when the names are correct, that all relative terms are correlative.

Correlatives are commonly held to come into existence together, and this for the most part is true, as, for instance, of double and half. That a half exists means that the double of which it is half must exist. The existence of a master involves the existence also of a slave. If a slave exists, then must a master. And so in all similar cases. Moreover, this holds of them also: to cancel one cancels the other. For instance, no double, no half, and, *per contra*, no half, then no double: and so with all similar terms. However, the view that correlatives come into being together does not appear true at all times, for it

7 b εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρότερον ἂν δόξειε τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προὔπ-
 25 ἀρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ' ὀλίγων γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἐπ' οὐδενὸς ἴδοι-
 τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γινομένην.

Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἢ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ἐπιστητοῦ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη), ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι, οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἶγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν. ἔτι ζώου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ' ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.

85 Ὅμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει. τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ. αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀναι-
 8 a ρεῖται καὶ τὸ σῶμα (τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα), σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἢ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ζώου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀναιρεῖται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.

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seems that the object of knowledge is prior to, exists before, knowledge. We gain knowledge, commonly speaking, of things that already exist, for in very few cases or none can our knowledge have come into being along with its own proper object.

Should the object of knowledge be removed, then the knowledge itself will be cancelled. The converse of this is not true. If the object no longer exists, there can no longer be any knowledge, there being now nothing to know. If, however, of this or that object no knowledge has yet been acquired, yet that object itself may exist. Take the squaring of the circle, for instance, if that can be called such an object. Although it exists as an object, the knowledge does not yet exist. If all animals ceased to exist, there would then be no knowledge at all, though there might in that case, notwithstanding, be still many objects of knowledge.

The same may be said of perception. The object, I mean, would appear to be prior to the act of perception. Suppose that you cancel the perceptible ; you cancel the perception as well. Take away or remove the perception, the perceptible still may exist. For the act of perception implies or involves, first, a body perceived, then a body in which it takes place. Therefore, if you remove the perceptible, body itself is removed, for the body itself is perceptible. And, body not being existent, perception must cease to exist. Take away the perceptible, then, and you take away also perception. But the taking away of perception does not take such objects away. If the animal itself is destroyed, then perception is also destroyed. But perceptibles yet will remain, such as body, heat, sweetness and bitterness and everything else that is sensible.

- 8^a Ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίνεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ζῳῷ γίνεται καὶ αἰσθησις· τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῶον ἡ αἰσθησιν εἶναι· πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ
 10 ζῶον συνίσταται, ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῶον ὅλως εἶναι ἡ αἰσθησιν, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.

- Ἐχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν
 15 πρὸς τι λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἡ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τινας τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρὸς τι λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ τις ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τις βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη·
 20 ἡ γὰρ τις χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινος χεὶρ, καὶ ἡ τις κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ τινος κεφαλὴ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπὶ γε τῶν πλείστων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ
 25 τινος κτῆμα λέγεται. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρὸς τι· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 80 ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρὸς τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἡ τῶν

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Perception, further, comes into being along with the subject perceiving—that is, with the live thing itself. The perceptible, however, is prior to the animal and to perception. For such things as water and fire, out of which are composed living beings, exist before any such beings and prior to all acts of perception. The perceptible, so we conclude, would appear to be prior to perception.

The view that no substance is relative—a view that is commonly held—would appear to be open to question. Exception, perhaps, should be made in the case of some secondary substances. Doubtless, the view we refer to holds good of the primary substance, for neither the wholes nor the parts of first substances ever are relative. This man or that ox, for example, is never defined with a reference to something beyond or outside. And the same also holds of their parts. Thus a certain hand or head is not said to be a certain hand of someone or other, a certain head of someone or other. We call them *the* hand and *the* head of this specified person or that. So, too, with the secondary substances, at least with the vast generality. Species, like ‘man,’ ‘ox’ and so forth, are never defined with a reference to something beyond or outside them. Neither is ‘wood’ so defined, and, if wood is regarded as relative, then is it so as a *property*, belonging to someone or other, and not in its character of wood. It is evident, then, in such cases that substance can hardly be relative. Opinions, however, may differ in the case of some secondary substances. Thus we define ‘head’ and ‘hand’ in the light of the wholes they belong to, and so these might seem to be relative. Indeed, it would prove very hard, not to say an impossible task,

8^a πάννυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρὸς τι λέγεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὰ πρὸς τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθεῖν τι πρὸς αὐτά. ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ
 85 μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς τι, οὐ μὴν ταὐτόν γέ ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεσθαι.

Ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι εἰάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὠρισμένως τῶν πρὸς τι, κακείνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὠρισμένως εἴσεται. φανερόν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ οἶδὲ τις τόδε τι ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς
 8^b τι, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρὸς τι ταὐτόν τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν, κακείνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδε
 9 ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἐστὶ διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθύς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν· εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ' εἰ διπλάσιόν ἐστιν ὅλως οἶδεν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν εὐθύς ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἶ-
 10 δέναι διὰ ταῦτα. οὐκ ἀορίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις γὰρ τὸ

* There seems to be something wrong here with the text.

CATEGORIES, vii

thus to show that *no* substance is relative, if we correctly defined what was meant by a relative term. On the other hand, if we were wrong, if those things are true relatives only, whose very existence consists in their being in some way or other related to some other object, then something, I think, might be said. The former definition applies to all relatives beyond any doubt; but the fact that a thing is explained by a reference to something outside it is not the same thing as to say that it is of necessity relative.^a

From what we have said this is plain: if a relative is definitely known, that to which it is relative also will then be as definitely known. What is more, we may call this self-evident. Provided, that is, that you know a particular thing to be relative, relatives being those objects whose very existence consists in their being in some way or other related to some other thing, then you know what that other thing is to which that thing itself is related. For if you did not know at all that to which it is somehow related, you could not so much as know whether it was or it was not a relative. Take some particular instances; then will the point be quite clear. For suppose that you definitely know a particular thing to be 'double'; then at once will you definitely know also that thing of which it is double. You cannot know *that* it is double *without* knowing that it is double of something specific and definite. Again, if you definitely know a particular thing is more beautiful, at once must you definitely know that than which it is reckoned more beautiful. Thus you will not vaguely know that particular thing has more beauty than something possessing less beauty. For that would be mere

8 b

τοιούτο γίνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀκριβῶς
 εἴσεται ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως
 ἔτυχεν, οὐδέν ἐστι χείρον αὐτοῦ. ὥστε φανερόν
 ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρὸς τι
 15 ἀφωρισμένως, κακείνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀφωρι-
 σμένως εἰδέναι.

Τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον
 τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ εἰσιν οὐσίαι, αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶ
 ὠρισμένως ἐστὶν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται, οὐκ
 ἀναγκαῖον. τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἢ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἢ
 20 χεῖρ, οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰδέναι ὠρισμένως. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν
 εἶη ταῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τῶν
 πρὸς τι, ἀληθές ἂν εἶη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία
 τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστιν. ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν
 τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπ-
 εσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ' ἑκάστου
 αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.

25 VIII. Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες
 εἶναι λέγονται. ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς
 λεγομένων. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ
 διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως
 τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον.
 τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ τε ἐπιστήμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἡ τε
 30 γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ
 δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ,
 ἐὰν περ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου
 ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή,
 οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον
 35 τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ'

CATEGORIES, VII-VIII

supposition and not really knowledge at all; you would no longer certainly know that a thing was possessed of more beauty than something possessed of less beauty. For, indeed, it might happen that nothing existed possessing less beauty. From all this, I think, it is plain that a definite knowledge of relatives means a like knowledge of those things whereto they stand in a relation.

Yet a head or a hand is a substance, and men can have definite knowledge what such things essentially are, though without of necessity knowing to what they are also related. For *whose* is this head or this hand, that they cannot determinately know. But, if so, we are forced to conclude that these things and their like are not relatives, and, this being so, it would be true to affirm that no substance is relative. I think it is no easy matter to dogmatize over such problems without more exhaustive inquiry. To bring up the points in detail is, however, not itself wholly useless.

VIII. To quality let us turn next. By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which men are called such and such. The word 'quality' has many senses. Let habits and dispositions here constitute one kind of quality. The former are unlike the latter in being more lasting and stable. Comprised among what we call 'habits' are virtues and all kinds of knowledge. For knowledge is considered as lasting and hard to displace from the mind, though a man may, in fact, have acquired it in only a moderate measure, unless some great change should come over him, thanks to disease or the like. And the same will hold good of the virtues—for instance, of temperance, justice. For these are allowed on all hands

- 8^b εὐμετάβολον. διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἃ ἔστιν εὐ-
κινητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ
κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ
ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς
9^a γενόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν,
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μὴ τις καὶ
αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλήθος ἥδη
πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνιάτος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα,
ἣν ἂν τις ἴσως ἔξιν ἥδη προσαγορεύοι. φανερόν
δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἔξεις λέγειν, ἃ ἔστι πολυ-
χροنيώτερα καὶ δυσκινήτοτερα· τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπι-
στημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντάς ἄλλ' εὐκινήτους ὄντας
οὐ φασιν ἔξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινται γέ πως κατὰ
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χειρόν ἢ βέλτιον. ὥστε διαφέρει
ἔξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ
10 πολυχροنيωτέραν τε καὶ δυσκινήτοτέραν. εἰσὶ δὲ
αἱ μὲν ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεις ἔχοντες καὶ
διάκεινται γέ πως κατ' αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι
οὐ πάντως καὶ ἔξιν ἔχουσιν.

Ἔτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ' ὃ πυκτικούς ἢ
15 δρομικούς ἢ ὑγιεινούς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ
ἀπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν
λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαι γέ πως ἕκαστον
τῶν τοιούτων ποιὸν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν
20 ἔχειν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ραδίως

CATEGORIES, VIII

to be hard to dislodge or displace. Dispositions, however, are qualities easy to move or to change, such as heat, cold, disease, health and so on. A man is *disposed* in some manner according to all such conditions but rapidly undergoes change. Being warm, he may soon become cold ; being well, he may soon become sick. So it is with all other dispositions, unless one should chance to become second nature through long lapse of time, proving either inveterate or else, at the least, very hard to displace, when we might, I think, call it a habit.

Those qualities, then, it is clear, men incline to denominate 'habits,' which are by their nature more lasting and are the more hard to displace. Those who cannot at all master knowledge and are of a changeable temper are scarcely described nowadays as possessing the 'habit' of knowing, although we may say that their minds, when regarded from that point of view, are disposed in a way towards knowledge—I mean, in a better or worse. Thus is habit unlike disposition ; the former is lasting and stable, the latter soon undergoes change. Habits are also dispositions ; dispositions are not always habits. While those who have habits are disposed in some manner or other in consequence, those who are some way disposed have by no means in each case a habit.

By the next kind of quality I mean that which leads us to speak of good boxers, good runners, the healthy or sickly. Indeed, it will cover all terms that denote any natural capacity, any innate incapacity. Not from their being disposed or conditioned in this or that manner, but rather from having a power, which is natural, innate or inborn, or, it may be, the lack of such power to achieve this or that

^{9 a} ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν, οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ οὐ τῷ
²⁰ διακεῖσθαι πως λέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν
 φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι ῥαδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται
 τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ
 τῶν τυχόντων ῥαδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν
 ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ῥαδίως ὑπὸ τῶν
²⁵ τυχόντων. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν
 καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται
 τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥαδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ
 μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.

Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες
 καὶ πάθη. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ
³⁰ πικρότης καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις
 συγγενῇ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευ-
 κότης καὶ μελανία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται ποιότητές
 εἰσι, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα αὐτὰ ποιά λέγεται
 κατ' αὐτάς, οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι
 γλυκὺ λέγεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητι
³⁵ δεδέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει.

Παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ
^{9 b} τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε
 γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκὺ, οὔτε
 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ὁμοίως δὲ τού-
 τοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ
^δ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα
 πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστην
 τῶν εἰρημένων ποιότητων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν
 παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἡ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης
 66

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thing with ease or avoid a defeat of some kind, do we say men possess such a quality. We call men good boxers or runners not in virtue of some disposition but owing to a natural capacity to do this or that thing with ease. When we speak of the healthy, we mean that such people have powers of resistance, ready, innate, constitutional, against all the commoner ills ; when we speak of the sickly, we mean those who seem to possess no such powers. It is thus, too, with hardness and softness. We predicate hardness of that which resists ready disintegration and softness of that which does not.

To continue, the third class contains passive qualities and also affections. Examples are sweetness and bitterness, sourness and all things akin to them ; such, too, are coldness and warmth ; such are whiteness and blackness and so on. It is evident all these are qualities, seeing that the things that possess them are in consequence called such and such. Just as honey itself contains sweetness and, therefore, is said to be sweet, so the body itself contains whiteness and, therefore, is said to be white. So it is in all similar cases.

The qualities that we call passive are not, indeed, given that name to denote that the things which possess them are thereby in some way affected or undergo change in themselves. Thus we call honey sweet, as we said ; but we do not imply that the honey itself is in some way affected. And so with all similar cases. Again, if we take heat and cold, though we call all such qualities passive, we do not imply that the things which admit or possess them are passive. We mean that the qualities mentioned can, one and all, *cause* a sensation. The sense, for

- ⁹ ^b πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι.
- 10 Λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαῖ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον· αἰσχυνθεῖς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεῖς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον
- 15 τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέποιθεν ἔκ τινων φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροῖαν εἰκὸς ἐστὶν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἂν, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροῖαν ὁμοίαν
- 20 γίγνεσθαι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπὸ τινων παθῶν δυσκιήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται. εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται (ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα), εἴτε διὰ νόσον
- 25 μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥαδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται· ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.
- Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥαδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ
- 30 οὐ· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοὶ τινες κατὰ ταύτας.

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example, of taste is affected by sweetness or sourness, by coldness or warmth that of touch. So it is with all qualities like them.

All colours, as whiteness or blackness, are qualities also and passive, but not in the same sense, however, as those we have hitherto mentioned. We give them that name from the fact that they spring from affections or passions. There are numerous changes of colour that clearly arise from affections. When men are ashamed, then they blush ; when alarmed, they turn pale and so on. So much is this really the case that, I think, when a man is by nature disposed towards shame or alarm as arising from a certain concomitance of bodily elements in him, we may not unfairly conclude that he takes on the corresponding colour. For that state of the bodily elements which for the moment accompanied the feeling of shame or alarm might very well also result from his physical organization, and thus a like colour might also arise in the process of nature. All states of this kind may be, therefore, included among passive qualities, seeing their source can be found in some constant and lasting affection. For whether their source can be found in the bodily organization or in long disease or sunburn, when they cannot be lightly removed and may even endure throughout life, yet a pale and a dusky complexion are always called qualities by us, because we are called such and such from our having that pallor or duskiness.

Conditions, however, arising from causes soon rendered inoperative, if not entirely removed, will be known as affections, not qualities, seeing that no one is called such and such on account of those con-

^{9 b} οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυρῆσθαι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.

Ὅμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν πα-
³⁵ θητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. ὅσα γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τινων παθῶν δυσκιήτων γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἢ τε μανικὴ
^{10 a} ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρῶτοί γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηται δυσαπ-
⁵ ἄλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὁλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται. ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὢν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι.
¹⁰ ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὔ.

Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης, καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὁμοίον ἐστιν. καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποῖόν τι
¹⁵ λέγεται· τῷ¹ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποῖόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ¹ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν δὲ ἕκαστον ποῖόν τι λέγεται. τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ

¹ τὸ B.

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ditions. He who blushes from shame is not, therefore, regarded as naturally ruddy, nor he who becomes pale from fear as one having a pallid complexion. We say 'So-and-so was affected.' Such states are affections, not qualities.

Likewise, there are in the soul passive qualities and also affections. When a man has a temper from birth and its source is in certain affections not easy to change or remove, then we give it the name of a quality. Madness and irascibility and so on are cases in point. For it is on account of such things that we call a man mad or irascible. Likewise, distractions of mind, which, although not innate in themselves, yet arise from a certain concomitance of some other elements in him and seem to be either enduring or at least very hard to remove, are denominated qualities also. For people are called such and such on account of conditions like these. On the contrary, those which arise from some source that is readily healed we shall call by the name of affections, such as being somewhat angry, when vexed. For a man is not known as bad-tempered from being, when vexed, somewhat angry. We say 'Such a man is affected.' Such states are affections, not qualities.

Of quality the fourth kind consists of the forms and the figures of things ; add to these also crookedness, straightness and all other qualities like them. For things are defined by these also as being of such and such nature. And things have a definite nature by being 'triangular,' 'quadrangular,' by being 'straight,' 'crooked' and so on. In virtue, indeed, of its figure or shape is each thing qualified. Rare and dense, rough and smooth, while appearing at

10^a λείον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιόν τι σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ
 ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιόν
 20 διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γὰρ μᾶλλον τινα φαίνεται τῶν
 μορίων ἐκάτερον δηλοῦν. πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ
 μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μακρὸν δὲ τῷ δι-
 εστάναι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· καὶ λείον μὲν τῷ ἐπ' εὐθείας
 πως τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερ-
 ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.

25 Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἂν τις φανείη τρόπος
 ποιότητος, ἀλλ' οἱ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν
 οὗτοί εἰσιν.

Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιά δὲ
 τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὅπως οὖν
 30 ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων
 καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον
 ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμ-
 ματικῆς γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης
 δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν
 ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν
 35 λέγεσθαι οἷον δρομικὸς ἢ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν
 10^b φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος παρ-
 ωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυ-
 νάμεσι καθ' ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ ταῖς
 ἐπιστήμασι καθ' ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ κατὰ
 διάθεσιν λέγονται· πυκτικὴ γὰρ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη
 5 καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως
 οἱ διακεείμενοι λέγονται. ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος
 κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν
 ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπου-

CATEGORIES, VIII

first sight to indicate quality, are foreign, in fact, from that class. They will rather be found to denote a particular position of the parts. Thus we call a thing dense, when the parts that compose it are closely compacted, but rare, when those parts have interstices ; rough, when some parts are projecting, but smooth, when the surface is smooth, upon which, so to speak, lie those parts.

These are the four kinds of quality. Others there possibly may be, but these are those strictly so called.

Qualities, then, are those mentioned. The things that derive their names from them or depend in some other way on them are said to be things qualified in some definite manner or other. In most—indeed, nearly all—cases the names of the qualified things are derived from the names of the qualities. From ‘whiteness,’ from ‘grammar,’ from ‘justice,’ we have ‘white,’ ‘grammatical,’ ‘just.’ So with all other similar cases.

Sometimes, however, the qualities having no names of their own, no derivative names can exist. Thus the name of the runner or boxer, so called from an innate capacity, cannot be derived from a quality. That is to say, such capacities have no particular names, as the sciences have, with a reference to which we call one man a boxer, another a wrestler and so on. By a science we mean a disposition ; each science, too, has its own name, such as boxing, for instance, or wrestling. And those who are that way disposed get their name from the name of the science. Sometimes, moreover, the quality possesses a well-defined name, but the thing that partakes of its nature does not also take its name from it. For instance, a good man is good from possessing the

10 b δαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν
10 δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.

Ποιά τοίνυν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιότητων λεγόμενα ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικία ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανία
15 καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτάς ποιά λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἀδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ πυρρῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.

Ἐπι δέ, ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ἢ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προ-
20 χειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἢ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἢ ἀδικία· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόσει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς τι οὔτε ποῦ οὔθ' ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν. ὡς-
25 αὐτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τὰ ποιά. λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει· λευκὸν γὰρ ὅν ἐτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι. οὐ πάντα δέ,
80 ἀλλὰ τὰ πλείστα. δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιο-

CATEGORIES, VIII

quality, virtue. We do not, however, derive the term, 'good,' from the other term, 'virtue.' Yet this is seldom the case.

Thus those things have a definite quality which have derived their name from it or in some other way depend on it.

Qualities admit contrariety—not in all cases, however. Justice and injustice are contraries, blackness and whiteness and so on. The things that are called such and such on account of their having these qualities also fall into this class. For the just and the unjust are contraries, the black and the white thing and so on. But this is not so in all cases. Red, yellow and similar colours are qualities that have no contraries.

If one of two contraries is a quality, the other is also a quality. This will be clear to whoever examines the rest of the categories. Injustice is contrary to justice, and justice itself is a quality : so, then, is also injustice. For no other category fits it, not quantity, neither relation, nor place, nor, in short, any other. This holds in the case of all contraries that we denominate qualities.

Qualities admit of degrees. For one thing is more white than another ; another, again, is less white. And one thing is more just than another. And a thing may get more of a quality ; for things that are white may get whiter. This rule, while it holds in most cases, is subject to certain exceptions. For if justice could be more or less justice, certain problems might thereon arise, as is also the case with all qualities which we may call dispositions. And some go so far as to say that these cannot admit of degrees. Health and justice them-

10 b σύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ δεῖν
 λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγείας,
 35 ἥττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειαν, καὶ
 11 a δικαιοσύνην ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμ-
 ματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις. ἀλλ' οὖν τά
 γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπι-
 δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον· γραμματικώτερος
 γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ ὑγιεινότερος καὶ
 5 δικαιοτέρος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως.

Τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλ-
 λον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν.
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον
 ἢ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ' ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι
 εἰσὶ, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδέν μᾶλλον ἕτερον
 10 ἑτέρου ῥηθήσεται· οὐδέν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον
 τοῦ ἑτερομήκου κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπι-
 δέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον. ἀπλῶς δέ, εἰ
 μὴ ἐπιδέχεται ἀμφοτέρα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου
 λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.
 οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιά ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
 τὸ ἥττον.

15 Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδέν ἴδιον ποιότητος,
 ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας
 λέγεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ'
 ἄλλο οὐδέν ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν
 εἴη τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι
 κατ' αὐτήν.

20 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταραττεσθαι, μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ
 ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν
 πρὸς τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἑξεις καὶ
 διαθέσεις τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν. σχεδὸν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρὸς τι λέγεται,

CATEGORIES, VIII

selves, they contend, are not subject to such variations, but people in varying degrees are possessed of health, justice and so on. The same with grammatical knowledge and all dispositions soever. And certainly none can deny that the things that are marked by such qualities have them in more or less measure. This man will know more about grammar, be healthier or juster than that.

Terms that express a thing's figure—'triangular,' 'rectangular' and so on—can hardly admit of degrees. For the objects to which the definition applies of triangle or circle are equally triangular or circular. Others, to which the definition of neither of these things applies, cannot differ themselves in degree. For the square is no more of a circle than is—let us say—the rectangle. To neither of these the definition we give of a circle applies. So, unless, in a word, the definition of the thing or the term thus in question is appropriate to both of the objects, they cannot at all be compared. Not all qualities, then, have degrees.

The aforementioned characteristics are no way peculiar to quality. What is peculiar is this, that we predicate 'like' and 'unlike' with a reference to quality only. For one thing is like to another in respect of some quality only. So this is distinctive of quality.

It must not cause us trouble, however, if someone objects to our statements that, quality being our theme, we include in that category also a good many relative terms. For both habits and dispositions we admitted to be relative terms. Now, at least in most cases, it happens that the genera,

11^a τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὔσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται (τινὸς
 25 γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται), τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμμα-
 τικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσικὴ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὐταὶ τῶν πρὸς τι λέγονται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ
 80 λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματικὴ, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη λέγεται, οὐ τινὸς μου-
 σικῇ.

Ὡστε αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρὸς τι. λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν· ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν
 85 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά. ὥστε αὐταὶ ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν, αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, καθ' ἃς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὐταὶ δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρὸς τι. ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνοι τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τι καὶ ποιὸν ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.

11^b IX. Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐναντιότητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι, ὥστε
 6 ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἥττον· θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.

Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· εἴρηται
 10 δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, ὅτι

CATEGORIES, VIII-IX

doubtless, are relative; not so the individuals. Knowledge, the genus, we define by a reference to something beyond it, for knowledge is knowledge *of* something. Particular branches, however, of knowledge are not thus explained. For example, we do not define by a reference to something external a knowledge of grammar or music. For these, if in some sense relations, can only be taken for such in respect of their genus or knowledge. That is to say, we call grammar the knowledge, *not* grammar, of something, and music we call, in like manner, the knowledge, *not* music, of something.

Thus particular branches of knowledge are not to be classed among relatives. People are called such and such from possessing these branches of knowledge. These are the things they possess, being, therefore, called 'knowing' or 'expert,' and never the genus or knowledge. And, therefore, those branches of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes described as of such and such nature, themselves must come under the category of quality, not of relation. Moreover, if anything happened to be both relation and quality, then it were nowise absurd to include it in both of these categories.

IX. Action and affection (or passion) have contraries and also degrees. That is, heating is contrary to cooling, as also being cooled to being heated or, again, being pleased to being pained. Thus it is they admit contrariety. Moreover, they allow of degrees; for you can heat or be heated more or less. Hence it follows that both action and affection may admit of variations of degree.

Of these categories so much is stated. Posture or position we spoke of, when dealing before with

11 b

παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐρρέθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὠπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποῦ οἶον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐρρέθη.

- 15 X. Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ῥητέον. λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς
- 20 κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν ὡς μὲν τὰ πρὸς τι, οἶον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οἶον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἶον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, οἶον κάθεται—οὐ κάθεται.
- 25 Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά, οἶον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον. καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεται γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ. καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν
- 30 δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀντικείμενον λέγεται, τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν, τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ

* The chapters that follow are commonly regarded by scholars as spurious.

CATEGORIES, IX-X

relation. We said that such terms get their names from the attitudes corresponding to them. The rest, that is, time, place and state, are so clear that I need say no more than I said at the very beginning—that a state is intended by terms such as being ‘shod,’ ‘armed’ and the like, whereas place is intended by phrases like ‘in the Lyceum’ and so forth.^a

X. We have now said enough on the subject of the categories that we proposed, and with opposites next we must deal and the various senses of the word. For we call things opposed in four ways—first of all, as correlatives are, either term of each pair to the other; in the next place, as contraries are; in the third place, as privatives to positives; lastly, as affirmatives to negatives. Speaking in outline, I mean that correlatives that are opposed are expressions like ‘double’ and ‘half,’ while of contraries that are opposed we may take ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for examples. Of privative and positive terms we may here mention ‘blindness’ and ‘sight,’ ‘he is sitting’ and ‘he is not sitting’ in the case of affirmatives and negatives.

Opposites, when relatives also, our custom it is to explain by referring the one to the other and using the genitive case or some other grammatical construction. Thus ‘double,’ a relative term, is explained as the double of something. And knowledge, a relative term, is opposed to the thing that is known and explained by a reference to it. The thing that is known is explained by a reference to its opposite, to knowledge: for the thing that is known will be known *by* a something—more precisely, by knowledge. All opposites, then, are

- 11^b πρὸς τι, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων λέγεται ἢ ὅπως-
 δήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται.
- 85 Τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ
 ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, ἐναντία
 μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ
 κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ
 λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον. ὥστε
 διαφέρουσιν αὐταὶ αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. ὅσα δὲ
- 12^a τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστὶν ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε
 γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν
 θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀνὰ μέσον.
 ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων
 ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον πάντως, οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια
- 5 ἐν σώματι ζώου πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν
 γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζώου σώματι, ἢ
 νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν. καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον
 ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον
 τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. καὶ
 οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου
- 10 καὶ ὑγείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτιου. ὧν δέ γε
 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι
 ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι
 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον
 αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἦτοι
 λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν. καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον
- 15 κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατὰ
 ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν
 ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν κατηγορηται· οὐ γὰρ
 πάντα ἦτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν. καὶ ἔστι
 γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ

CATEGORIES, x

explained by referring the one to the other and using the genitive case or some other grammatical construction, when these are correlatives also.

Opposites are no way dependent, when contraries, the one upon the other but are contrary one to the other. The good is not called, for example, the good of the bad but its contrary. Similarly, white is not known as the white of the black but its contrary. Thus these two kinds of opposition are entirely distinct from one another. But contraries such that the subjects in which they are naturally found or of which they can be predicated must needs contain the one or the other—these never can have intermediates. When there is no such necessity, then the reverse is the case, and they always will have an intermediate. For example, both health and disease may be said to be naturally present in the bodies of all living things, and in consequence one or the other must be present in animal bodies. We predicate both odd and even in similar manner of number ; in consequence, one or the other must always be present in number. Now, health and disease, odd and even, have no intermediate between them. But where there is no such necessity, then the reverse is the case. For example, both blackness and whiteness are naturally present in body, but neither need be in a body. For not every body existing must either be black or be white. Then we predicate goodness and badness of man, as of many things else. Neither goodness nor badness, however, although they are predicated of them, is present of necessity in them. Not all things are good or are bad. Now, such contraries have intermediates. Between black and white, for example, are sallow and

12 a μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
 20 χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε
 φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνό-
 ματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ
 μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
 χρώματα· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὐπορον
 τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δ' ἐκατέρου τῶν
 ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὀρίζεται, οἷον τὸ
 25 οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε
 ἄδικον.

Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταυτόν
 τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν·
 καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἕξις πέφυκε γίνεσθαι,
 περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν. ἐστερηῆσθαι
 δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν,
 80 ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν
 ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχειν. νωδὸν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ
 τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον
 ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ
 γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτε ὀδόντας, ἀλλ'
 οὐ λέγεται οὔτε νωδὰ οὔτε τυφλά.

85 Τὸ δὲ ἐστερηῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔστι
 στέρησις καὶ ἕξις. ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις,
 στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης· τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης.
 στέρησις γάρ τίς ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν
 εἶναι ἐστερηῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησις ἐστίν. ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ

grey and so forth, while between good and bad we have that which is neither the one nor the other. And some intermediate qualities have their own recognized names. We may take as examples again grey and sallow and similar colours, intermediate between white and black. In some of the cases, however, to name them were no easy matter. We then must define the intermediate as that which is neither extreme—'neither good nor yet bad,' for example, 'neither just nor unjust,' and so forth.

What are called 'privatives' and 'positives' refer to identical subjects, as blindness and sight to the eye. It is ever the case with such pairs that we predicate one or the other, wherever the particular 'positive' is naturally found or produced. Thus we say that what *may* have a faculty then is deprived of that faculty, when it is totally absent and yet should be naturally present and present also at that time. Not what is without teeth or sight do we, therefore, call toothless or blind. But we rather use those terms of that which has not but should have teeth or sight and should have teeth or sight at that time. For, indeed, certain creatures there are which from birth have no teeth or no sight but are not known as toothless or blind.

To possess and to be without faculties cannot be considered the same with the corresponding 'positives' and 'privatives.' 'Sight' is, for instance, a 'positive,' 'blindness,' its opposite, a 'privative.' 'Sight' and 'to have sight,' however, must not be considered identical. So 'to be blind' is not 'blindness.' For 'blindness,' we said, is a 'privative,' but 'to be blind' signifies a condition of want or privation. 'To be blind' is itself not a 'privative.' This may,

^{12 a}
⁴⁰ τυφλότης ταῦτόν τῳ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν
 ἀμφοτέρω κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν
^{12 b} λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης δὲ οὐδαμῶς λέγεται
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερηθῆναι
 καὶ τὸ τὴν ἑξίν ἔχειν, ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ
 τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης
 τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῳ
^b ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν καὶ
 κατάφασιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικός καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις
 λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ
¹⁰ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα
 ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·
 καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ
 αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
 φασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθεται τῳ οὐ κάθεται,
¹⁵ οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἐκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ
 καθῆσθαι τῳ μὴ καθῆσθαι.

Ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς
 τὰ πρὸς τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλό-
 τητος ὄψις, οὐδ' ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται.
 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης λέγοιτ' ἂν τυφλότης
²⁰ ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης
 λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται. ἔτι τὰ
 πρὸς τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε
 καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρὸς τι, ἀντέστρεφεν

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moreover, be noted, that, if 'to be blind' could be rightly considered the same thing with 'blindness,' then should we predicate both, without doubt, of identical things. This, however, is never the case. A man may be said to be blind; yet a man is not said to be blindness.

As 'positives' and 'privatives' are opposites, so are possessing a faculty and being in a state of privation. We have the same sort of antithesis. For to be blind and have sight are opposed just as blindness and sight.

What is affirmed in a statement is not of itself affirmation nor what is denied a denial. 'Affirmation' means 'affirmative statement,' 'denial' means 'a negative statement.' But what is affirmed or denied in a statement is matter of fact, not a statement, proposition, assertion. It, nevertheless, is the case that the things we affirm and deny are called opposites in the same sense. For we have the same sort of antithesis. Just as the affirmative statement and the negative themselves are opposed—take the two propositions, for instance, 'he sits' and 'he is not sitting'—so, too, are the facts thus expressed or his sitting, that is, and not sitting.

'Positives' and 'privatives' clearly are not in the same sense opposed as are relatives one to the other. We do not explain them, I mean, by referring the one to the other. We do not call sight sight of blindness, nor use any other form of statement that serves to bring out a relation. And blindness, in similar manner, we do not call blindness of sight, but we call it privation of sight. Again, relative terms are reciprocal. Therefore, were blindness a relative,

12 b ἂν κακείνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει
 25 οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.

Ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ὥς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ
 στέρησιν καὶ ἔξιν λεγόμενα, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστίν ἀνὰ μέσον,
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἡ ὧν κατ-
 30 ηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν αἰεί· τούτων
 γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἦν ἀναγκαῖον
 τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας
 καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον,
 οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε
 γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν,
 οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε ψυχρόν· τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον
 35 τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν
 τι ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν
 ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἐν ὑπάρχει,
 οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ
 40 λευκῇ. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον
 θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ
 γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα
 13 a μέλαιναν. ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῷ δεκτικῷ
 θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ

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blindness and sight would reciprocate. This is, however, not so. For we do not call sight sight of blindness.

That 'positives' and 'privatives,' moreover, are not in the same sense opposed as are contraries one to the other seems perfectly clear from the following. When contraries have no intermediate, we saw that the one or the other must ever be present in the subject in which they are naturally found or of which they will serve as the predicates. Where this necessity obtained, then the terms could have no intermediates. Health and disease, odd and even, were mentioned above as examples. But where contraries have an intermediate, no such necessity obtains. It was not every subject that *may* be receptive of black and of white that must, therefore, *be* black or *be* white. And the same, too, with coldness and heat. That is, something or other intermediate between black and white may be present, between hot and cold and the like. (Moreover, we have already seen that those contraries had an intermediate, where it was not a necessity that one of the two should be inherent in everything capable of receiving them.) An exception must, however, be made where one contrary naturally inheres. To be hot is the nature of fire, and the nature of snow to be white. In such cases, then, *one* of the contraries needs must be definitely present, *not one or the other*, in things. It is out of the question that fire should be cold or that snow should be black. Hence it follows that one of the contraries need not be present in all things that may be receptive of such. It is present of necessity only in the subjects in which it inheres. And, moreover,

13^a ἐν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον
 δ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὔτε¹ γὰρ αἰὲ τῷ δεκτικῷ
 ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· τὸ γὰρ μήπω
 πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχον
 λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων
 ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον. ἀλλ' οὐδ'
 ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ποτε παντὶ
 10 τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ
 ἤδη πεφυκὸς ἢ ὄψιν ἔχειν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν
 ἔχον ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως
 θάτερον, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
 ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον²
 ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ
 15 τισί, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἐν. ὥστε δῆλον
 ὅτι κατ' οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία
 — ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.

Ἐπὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ
 20 δεκτικοῦ, δυνατόν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι,
 εἰ μὴ τινι φύσει τὸ ἐν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ
 θερμῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατόν νοσήσαι
 καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν
 θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύ-
 λου σπουδαῖον δυνατόν γενέσθαι. ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος
 εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν

¹ οὐδὲ B.

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in cases like this it is definitely one or the other, not *either* the one *or* the other, which is of necessity present.

Neither of the foregoing statements holds good of our 'positives' and 'privatives.' Subjects receptive of such are not bound to have one or the other. For what is not yet at the stage when it naturally ought to have sight is not called either seeing or sightless. And 'positives' and 'privatives,' therefore, are not to be classed with those contraries where there is no intermediate. Neither, again, should we class them with contraries having intermediates. For one or the other at times must form part of each possible subject. When a thing should by nature have sight, we shall say that it sees or is blind, indeterminately and not of necessity but whichever it happens to be. It has not of necessity sight; it is not of necessity blind; it must be in one state or the other. But have we not already seen that of contraries having intermediates neither the one nor the other need be found in each possible subject but definitely one of the pair must be present in some of those subjects? That 'positives' and 'privatives,' therefore, are not opposed one to the other in either of the same ways as contraries will be evident from the foregoing.

Of contraries this, too, holds good, that, the subject remaining identical, either may change to the other, unless, indeed, one of those contraries constitutes part of that subject, as heat constitutes part of fire. What is healthy may well become sick, what is white may in time become black, what is cold may in turn become hot. And the good becomes bad, the bad good. For the bad man, when once introduced to new modes both of living and thinking, may improve,

13 a

25 μικρόν γέ τι ἐπιδορίη εἰς τὸ βελτίων εἶναι. εἰάν
 δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερόν ὅτι ἡ
 τελέως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν
 λάβοι· αἰεὶ γὰρ εὐκίνητοτερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίνεται,
 κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφώς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ, ὥστε
 καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν. καὶ
 30 τοῦτο αἰεὶ γινόμενον τελείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν
 ἀποκαθίστησιν, εἰάν περ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται. ἐπὶ
 δέ γε τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως ἀδύνατον εἰς
 ἀλλήλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι. ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως
 ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερή-
 35 σεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον. οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενό-
 μενός τις πάλιν ἀνέβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν πάλιν
 κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὁδόντας ἔφυσεν.

Ἔοσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται,
 13 b φανερόν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων
 ἀντίκειται· ἐπὶ γὰρ μόνων τούτων ἀναγκαῖον αἰεὶ
 τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὔτε
 γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον αἰεὶ θάτερον
 ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς
 6 τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως. οἷον ἡ
 ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε
 ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ
 διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ
 οὐκ ἐστίν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος.
 οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ
 10 ἡ τυφλότης. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλο-
 κὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος ἐστίν·
 πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται.

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειε τὸ τοιοῦτο συμ-

* See what was said in c. 4 upon uncombined words, truth and falsity.

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be it ever so little. And should such a man once improve, even though it be only a little, he might, it is clear, make great progress or even, indeed, change completely. For ever more easily moved and inclined is a man towards virtue, although in the very first instance he made very little improvement. We naturally, therefore, conclude he will make ever greater advance. And, if so, as the process continues, it will at length change him entirely, provided that time is allowed.

As for 'positives' and 'privatives,' however, there cannot be change in *both* ways. From possession you may pass to privation but not from the latter to the former. A man who has once become blind never finds that his sight is restored, as a man who has once become bald never after recovers his hair and a man who has once lost his teeth never after can grow a new set.

Affirmations and negations are opposed, it is patent, in none of those ways upon which we have already touched. It is here, and here only, indeed, that one opposite needs must be true, while the other must always be false. In the case of other opposites—contraries, correlatives, positives and privatives—this will in no wise hold good. Thus of health and disease, which are contraries, neither is true, neither false. Take correlatives, 'double' and 'half.' Again, neither is true, neither false. So also with 'positives' and 'privatives,' such as are blindness and sight. To sum up, unless words are combined, 'true' and 'false' can have no application. And all the afore-mentioned opposites are but mere uncombined words.^a

However, when words that are contraries consti-

13 b βαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγο-
μένων· τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτην τῷ νοσεῖν
15 Σωκράτην ἐναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων
ἀναγκαῖον αἰεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθές θάτερον δὲ
ψεῦδος εἶναι. οἷτος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἐσται τὸ
μὲν ἀληθές τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ οἷτος δὲ ἀμφοτέρα
ψευδῇ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην οὔτε τὸ
ὑγιαίνειν ἐστίν ἀληθές αὐτοῦ μὴ οἷτος ὅλως τοῦ
Σωκράτους.

20 Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ οἷτος
τε ὅλως οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, οἷτος τε οὐκ αἰεὶ
θάτερον ἀληθές θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ ὅψιν
ἔχειν Σωκράτην τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτην ἀντί-
κειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ οἷτος τε οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθές εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος (ὅτε γὰρ
25 μήπω πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφοτέρα ψευδῇ), μὴ οἷτος
τε ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ οὕτω ψευδῇ ἀμφο-
τερα, καὶ τὸ ὅψιν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως
αἰεὶ, εἴαν τε ἦ εἴαν τε μὴ ἦ, τὸ ἕτερον ἐσται ψεῦδος
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές. τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην
80 καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην, οἷτος τε αὐτοῦ φανε-
ρὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ
οἷτος ὁμοίως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ οἷτος ψεῦδος,
τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές. ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων
ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος
85 εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται.

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tute parts of those statements opposed as affirmative and negative, these would especially seem to lay claim to this characteristic. The statement that 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well.' Yet we cannot maintain even here that one statement must always be true and the other must always be false. For, if Socrates really exists, one is true and the other is false. But if Socrates does not exist, both the one and the other are false. To say 'he is ill' will be false, and to say 'he is well' will be false, if no Socrates so much as exists.

As for 'positives' and 'privatives,' however, if the subject is not in existence, then neither proposition is true. If the subject exists, even then one will not be true always, one false. That 'Socrates has sight,' for example, is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the sense in which 'opposite' was used as applied to privation and possession. Now, if Socrates really exists, it is not of necessity the case that one statement is true and one false. For he may not as yet have arrived at the stage when a man acquires sight, so that both of the statements are false, as they are, if he does not exist.

To return to affirmation and negation. Of these we may say in all cases that one must be false and one true, be the subject existent or not. For, if Socrates really exists, 'he is ill' or 'not ill' must be true; 'he is ill' or 'not ill' must be false. And the same, if he does not exist. For, provided he does not exist, it is false to pronounce 'he is ill'; 'he is not ill,' however, is true. Thus that one of the two must be true and the other be false in all cases will hold of those opposites only which are in the same sense opposed as affirmative and negative statements.

13 b

XI. Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἑαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, 14 a οἷον ὑγεία νόσος καὶ ἀνδρεία δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὅτε μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὅτε δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδεία κακῷ ὄντι ἢ ὑπερβολῇ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ 15 μεσότης ἐναντία ἐκατέρω, οὔσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων αἰεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰς θάτερον ἢ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι. ὑγιαίνοντων μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ὑγεία μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὐ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὐ. ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν τῷ 10 Σωκράτην νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστί, μὴ ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι· ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην.

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταῦτόν ἡ εἶδει ἡ γένει 15 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία. νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγεία ἐν σώματι ζώου πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἀπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου.

Ἄνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει 20 εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος), δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος)· ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ

XI. The contrary of good must be evil, and this can be proved by induction. The contrary of health is disease, that of courage is cowardice and so on. Of an evil, however, the contrary is either a good or an evil. For instance, defect is an evil; its contrary, excess, is an evil. But the mean, which is contrary to either in an equal degree, is a good. You, however, find few such exceptions, and, generally speaking, it is true that the contrary of evil is good.

It does not of necessity follow that, if one of the contraries exists, then the other must also exist. For suppose that all things became healthy. There then would be health, not disease. Or suppose that all things became white. There would then be white only, not black. Inasmuch, too, as Socrates ill is the contrary of Socrates well and both contraries cannot exist at one time in the same individual, if one of the contraries existed, the other could not then exist. For, provided he was well was the fact, he was ill could not also be fact.

This point will be evident also: the subjects of contrary qualities must have the same species or genus. For health and disease have for subject the body of some living creature, and whiteness and blackness a body which need not be specified further. And justice, likewise, and injustice arise in the souls of mankind.

In addition, two contrary qualities always belong to one genus or else to the contrary genera, when they are not themselves genera. White, for example, and black will belong to the same genus, colour. Justice, again, and injustice fall under two contrary genera, those we call virtue and vice. Good and evil

^{14 a}
²⁵ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη
τινῶν ὄντα.

XII. Πρώτερον ἐτέρου ἕτερον λέγεται τετραχῶς,
πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ' ὃ
πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἐτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγε-
ται· τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ πρεσ-
βύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται.

⁸⁰ Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῶν δύο πρότερον·
δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθύς τὸ ἐν εἶναι,
ένος δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ
ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνός ἢ ἀκολουθήσις τοῦ εἶναι
τὸ λοιπόν. πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι,
⁸⁵ ἀφ' οὗ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει ἢ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσις.

Τρίτον δὲ κατὰ τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. ἐν
τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ
πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὑστέρον τῇ τάξει (τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα
^{14 b} πρότερα τῶν διαγραμμαμάτων τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν),
ἐπὶ τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ προοίμιον τῆς
διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν.

Ἐπὶ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώ-
τερον πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ. εἰώθασι δὲ
⁵ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμότερους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγα-
πωμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν παρ' αὐτοῖς
εἶναι. ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν
τρόπων οὗτος.

* ἡ γραμματικὴ, a much wider term in the Greek than is
'grammar' in English. Here it may very well signify
reading or writing or both.

CATEGORIES, XI-XII

belong to no genera, being themselves actual genera, having subordinate species.

XII. There are four different senses in which we may call one thing 'prior' to another. Whenever we use the term 'prior' in its proper and primary sense, it is time that we have in our minds. It is thus that we call a thing 'older,' 'more ancient' than some other thing, signifying that its time has been longer.

Secondly, 'prior' may be used, when the order of being is fixed and incapable of being reversed. 'One' is prior, among numbers, to 'two.' For provided, that is, 'two' exists, then it follows that 'one' must exist. The existence of 'one,' on the contrary, does not imply that of 'two.' And the order of being, in consequence, cannot be changed and reversed. Thus of two things we call that one 'prior' which precedes in irreversible sequence.

Thirdly, we use the term 'prior' in regard to any order whatever. And this is the case in the sciences, as it is also with speeches. In sciences using demonstration we have what is prior in its order and what is, *per contra*, posterior. Take geometrical science: the elements—points, lines and so on—are prior to propositions or problems. And, likewise, in what we call 'grammar' ^a the letters are prior to the syllables. So in the case of a speech will the poem be prior to the narrative.

Besides the three senses aforesaid whatsoever is better, more honourable, is said to be naturally prior. Thus the common folk, speaking of those whom they hold in esteem or affection, describe them as coming first with them or having prior place in their hearts. But this use seems the strangest of all.

14 b

10

Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ ἕτερος εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρέφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν τὸ αἴτιον ὅπως οὖν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως τῇ φύσει λέγοιτ' ἂν. ὅτι δ' ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ
 15 τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ὡς λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ὡς λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα,
 20 τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμα φαίνεται πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται.

25 XIII. Ἄμα δὲ λέγεται ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἔστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ· οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται. φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἔστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος·
 30 ἀντιστρέφει μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα (διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἡμισυ καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν), οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἔστιν.

καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα
 35 ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται. ἀντιδιηρησθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν,

CATEGORIES, XII-XIII

These, I think, are the four distinct senses in which we may use the term 'prior.' Yet another might seem to exist beyond those we have already mentioned. For where in the case of two things the existence of either implies or necessitates that of the other, that thing which is somehow the cause may, in consequence, fairly be considered as naturally prior to the other. Such cases can clearly be found. The existence of a man, for example, necessitates the truth of the statement wherein we assert his existence. The converse is also the case. For if he exists, then the statement asserting that fact will be true. If the statement, conversely, is true, then the man referred to must exist. The true statement, however, is nowise the cause of the man's thus existing; and yet his existence would seem in some manner or other the cause of the truth of the true proposition. For the latter is called 'true' or 'false,' as the man thus exists or does not. So it seems that we use the term 'prior' in as many as five different senses.

XIII. 'Simultaneous' we use in its primary and most correct meaning of things that have come into being together. For neither in that case is prior, nor is either posterior to the other. We mean 'simultaneous in time.' 'Simultaneous' in nature we apply to those things where the being of either necessitates that of the other but neither is cause of the other. For instance, take 'double' and 'half,' for these two have reciprocal dependence. If a double exists, then a half; if a half exists, also a double. And neither of these is the cause of the other's existence or being.

Species marked off and opposed under one genus each to the others are called 'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those marked off or divided by

14 b οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνυδρῷ· ταῦτα
 γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιήρηται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους·
 τὸ γὰρ ζῶον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἰς τε τὸ πτηνὸν
 καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων
 πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ
 15 α τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι. διαιρεθεῖν δ' ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον
 τῶν τοιούτων εἰς εἶδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ
 πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνυδρον. ἔσται οὖν κακεῖνα ἅμα
 τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν
 5 αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν ἐστίν. τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν αἰεὶ
 πρότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι
 ἀκολουθήσιν, οἷον ἐνυδρου μὲν οἷτος ἐστὶ ζῶον,
 ζώου δὲ οἷτος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐνυδρον εἶναι.

Ἄμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει
 μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ
 10 αἷτιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστι, καὶ τὰ
 ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα ἀλλήλοις·
 ἀπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

XIV. Κινήσεως δὲ ἐστὶν εἶδη ἕξ, γένεσις, φθορά,
 αὔξεις, μείωσις, ἀλλοιώσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μετα-
 βολή.

15 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φανερόν ὅτι ἕτεραι
 ἀλλήλων εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ
 γε ἡ αὔξις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον μετα-
 βολή, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλ-
 λοιώσεως ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μή ποτε ἀναγκαῖον
 20 ἢ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατὰ τινα τῶν λοιπῶν κινήσεων
 ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστι· σχεδὸν
 γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλείστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι
 συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων

identical modes of division. That is to say, the 'winged' species is called 'simultaneous' in nature with both the 'aquatic' and 'terrestrial.' All are marked off and opposed under one genus each to the others. For into these species is 'animal,' the genus, marked off by division. And none will be prior or posterior; all are in nature 'simultaneous.' Each of these species is further marked off into certain subspecies, which also are called 'simultaneous' in nature for just the same reasons. The genus is prior to the species. That is to say that the order of being cannot be reversed. If the species 'aquatic' exists, then does also the genus or 'animal'; but granted the genus exists, there is not of necessity the species.

Thus we call 'simultaneous' in nature those things where the being of either necessitates that of the other but neither is cause of the other, and also those species marked off and opposed under one genus only. We use 'simultaneous,' too, in its first and unqualified sense of those things that have come into being at one and the same time together.

XIV. There are six kinds of what we call motion—generation, that is, and destruction, increase, diminution, alteration and, finally, changes of place. With a single exception it is plain that all these are distinct from each other. Destruction is not generation, and increase is not diminution, nor yet does it mean change of place. And so also it is with the rest. In the case of alteration, however, it may be objected by some that a subject, when altered, is altered by one of the other five motions. And yet this is not really so. For by all or, at least, most affections alterations are brought about in us that have nought in common whatever with those other motions we


15 a κοινωνοῦσιν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐξέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ
 πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
 25 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ' ἑτέρα ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας
 κινήσεις ἢ ἀλλοιώσεις· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ
 ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθύς καὶ αὐξέσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι ἢ
 τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων· ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον ἢ τινα
 ἄλλην κίνησιν κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἔδει· ἀλλ'
 30 ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦνται, οἷον τὸ
 τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ^{οὐδὲν} ηὔξηται μὲν,
 ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ὥσθ' ἑτεραι ἂν
 εἴησαν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλων.

15 b Ἔστι δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν κινήσει ^{ἡρεμία} ἡρεμία ἐναντία, ταῖς
 δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά,
 αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἢ
 κατὰ τόπον ἡρεμία. μάλιστα δ' ὅμοιον ἀντικεῖσθαι
 5 ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ
 κάτωθεν ἢ ἄνω, τῇ δὲ ἄνωθεν ἢ κάτω. τῇ δὲ
 104

mentioned. For that which is thereby affected need not be increased or diminished or undergo any such process. It follows that alteration is different from all other species of motion. For, were it the same with some other, the object, when altered, would straightway be also increased or diminished or undergo some other motion. But that is not so of necessity. Moreover, whatever was increased or was subject to some other motion would be of necessity altered. And yet there are things that increase and are not thereby altered as well. For example, if a gnomon is added, a square is increased in its size but does not undergo alteration, remaining a square as before.^a So it is with all similar forms. Alteration and increase, it follows, are two distinct species of motion.

Rest is, broadly, the contrary of motion. But particular species of motion have each their particular contraries. Thus change in place may be said to have rest in a place for its contrary, increase will have diminution, generation destruction or corruption. But as for the first of those mentioned, a change to the contrary place would appear in the strictest sense contrary—that is, ascent to descent and descent to ascent and the like. But as for the

^a The accompanying figure illustrates what is meant about the square and the Gnomon.



15 b λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθειςῶν κινήσεων οὐ ράδιον ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστίν ἐναντίον, ὅμοιος δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίον, εἰ μὴ τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἡρεμίαν ἀντιτιθείη ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον
 10 τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολήν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἡρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοιώσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. ὥστε ἀντικείμεται τῇ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἡρεμία ἢ ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μετα-
 15 βολή, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γίνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίνεσθαι· ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γινομένης.

XV. Τὸ δὲ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται. ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα·
 20 λεγόμεθα γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν. ἢ ὡς ποσόν, οἷον ὁ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος· λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ. ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δακτύλιον. ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα. ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, οἷον
 25 ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον· οἶνον γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς· ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ. ἢ ὡς κτῆμα· ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν ἢ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα.

Λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ
 80 ἄνδρα· ὅμοιος δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος

motion remaining of those we have mentioned above, it were no easy matter to say what its contrary actually is. And, in fact, it appears to have none or, here too, it is 'rest in its quality' or 'change to the contrary quality,' just as we said change of place had for contrary rest in a place or a change to a contrary place. Alteration means change of a quality. Therefore, to qualitative motion we oppose either rest in its quality or change to a contrary quality. Thus black and white will be contraries; therefore, becoming the one will be contrary to becoming the other. There is change of a quality here, which implies alteration, in consequence, into a contrary quality.

XV. 'To have' has a good many meanings. We use it of habits, dispositions and also of all other qualities. Thus we are said to 'have' virtue, to 'have' this or that piece of knowledge. And then it is used of a quantity, such as the height a man has. So it is that we say that a man 'has' a stature of three or four cubits. Again, it is used of apparel; a man 'has' a cloak or a tunic. Moreover, we use it of things that we 'have' on some part of the body, a ring on the finger, for instance. We employ it of parts of the body; a man 'has' a hand or a foot. It is used in the case of a vessel: a jar will be said to 'have' wine and a corn-measure said to 'have' wheat. And in cases like these we are thinking of what is *contained* in the vessel. Once more, we use 'have' of a property, men 'having' houses or fields.

People say that a man 'has' a wife and a wife, in like manner, a husband. This meaning is very

* In English, of course, we say 'hold.'

15 b τοῦ ἔχειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχει γυναῖκα σημαίνο-
μεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ.

Ἴσως δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν
τρόποι· οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες
κατηρίθμηνται.

far-fetched. When we say that a man has a wife, then we mean that he lives with her merely.

There may be more senses of 'have.' But the customary meanings, I think, are set forth in the foregoing summary.